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Introduction
The collapse of justice might manifest metaphorically. For example,
in November 1985, a guerrilla group frustrated by the government's viola-
tion of a ceasefire stormed Colombia's Palace of Justice and held all twenty-
five of the nation's Supreme Court justices-along with hundreds of civil-
ians-hostage.1 In March 2017, more than thirty years later, judges and
lawyers working in the Palace of Justice in Damascus were targeted in a
double bombing that resulted in dozens of deaths.2 In July 2018, protes-
ters held demonstrations in front of Port-au-Prince's Palais de Justice
demanding the release of Haitians arrested during a revolt against fuel
increases that disproportionately impacted the poor.3
In the aftermath of conflict, the need to stabilize the Rule of Law
1. Christopher Woody, 33 Years Ago, Rebels Allegedly Backed by Pablo Escobar
Stormed Colombia's Palace of Justice- Here's How the Terrifying Siege Went Down, Bus.
INSIDER (Nov. 8, 2018, 9:11 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/colombia-palace-of-
justice-siege-2016-11 [https://perma.cc/XDP4-8CBS]; see Luz Estella Nagle, The Cinder-
ella of Government: Judicial Reform in Latin America, 30 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 345, 356
(2000) ("Such was the case in Col[o]mbia in 1985 during the presidency of Belisario
Betancur, when the military staged what essentially amounted to a coup d'etat against
that nation's Supreme Court. This notorious incident was sparked by the poorly orches-
trated takeover of the Palace of Justice by the leftist guerrilla group, M-19."); Id. at 356
n.74 ("M-19's ill-planned operation was intended to call national attention to the move-
ment's social and political platform after negotiations with the Betancur administration
had broken down. The palace was destroyed during the military's assault and nearly all
the justices were killed.").
2. ILAC Rule of Law Assessment Report: Syria 2017, INT'L LEGAL ASSISTANCE CONSOR-
TIUM 1, 7 (2017), http://www.ilacnet.org/wp-content/uploads/
2 017/04/Syria2Ol7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3SSJ-CSFD] [hereinafter ILAC Report].
3. France Francois, Unrest in Haiti: What You Need to Know, NAT'L Pus. RADIO:
LATINO USA (July 24, 2018), https://www.latinousa.org/2018/07/24/unrest-in-haiti-
what-you-need-to-know [https://perma.cc/34TP-KQS7].
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almost always engenders broad consensus,4 but rebuilding a courthouse is
a far easier task than rebuilding a justice system. Whether international
bodies, such as the United Nations (U.N.); regional bodies, such as the
European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO);
or individual state actors take the lead in reconstruction efforts, establish-
ing a legitimate legal framework and strengthening institutions capable of
delivering just results is considered a primary step in rebuilding societies
that were destabilized or destroyed by conflict.
However, as Rachel Kleinfeld observed, fourteen years after Thomas
Carothers' pathbreaking analysis of the Rule of Law revival, little had
changed, and the Rule of Law remained as elusive as ever.5 Kleinfeld
argued that Rule of Law "practitioners and scholars keep waking up to the
same predicaments, noting them in the same working papers, and then
going back to do the same things."6 New models are clearly needed.7
The U.N. has recognized the need to reevaluate its post-conflict legal
reform strategy. In 2000, the United Nations Secretary General Kofi A.
Annan convened a "high-level Panel to undertake a thorough review of the
United Nations peace and security activities, and to present a clear set of
specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United
Nations in conducting such activities better in the future."8 The Panel,
chaired by former Foreign Minister of Algeria Lakhdar Brahimi, issued its
report later that year: the Brahimi Report.9 Reflecting on the experience
gained throughout U.N. peacekeeping missions during the past decades in
Cambodia, El Salvador, Angola, and Mozambique, the Brahimi Report rec-
ommended a doctrinal shift in peacekeeping operations. The shift
reflected an increased focus on strengthening Rule of Law institutions and
respecting human rights in post-conflict environments.10
4. Thomas Carothers, Foreword to RACHEL KLEINFELD, ADVANCING THE RULE OF LAW
ABROAD: NEXT GENERATION REFORM, at ix (2012).
5. RACHEL KLEINFELD, ADVANCING THE RULE OF LAw ABROAD: NEXT GENERATION
REFORM 2 (2012).
6. Id.
7. The unaddressed costs and consequences of conflict are well established. Con-
flict tends to recur in countries that have experienced prior conflict without successfully
addressing root causes. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011: CONFLICT,
SECURITY, AND DEVELOPMENT 2 (2011); see also Joint Staff Working Document on Advancing
the Principle of Complementarity: Toolkit for Bridging the Gap Between International and
National Justice, at 11, SWD (2013) 26 final (Feb. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Joint Staff Work-
ing Document].
[M]ore than 90[%] of civil wars in the 2000s occurred in countries that already
experienced a civil war in the previous [thirty] years.... "A country making
development advances ... loses an estimated 0.7[%] of GDP every year for each
neighbour in conflict. The average cost of civil war is equivalent to more than
[thirty] years of GDP growth for a medium-size developing country.... In other
words, a major episode of violence, unlike natural disasters or economic cycles,
can wipe out an entire generation of economic progress."
Id. at 5 (citing to WORLD BANK, supra note 7, at 5-6).
8. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, at
i, U.N. Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Brahimi Report].
9. Id.
10. Id. at 22.
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The U.N. was not alone in articulating the need to address legal system
reform head-on following conflict. In 2005, the Office of the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization, located within the United States
Department of State,11 issued the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essentials
Tasks Matrix (Tasks Matrix). The Tasks Matrix provides a toolkit for plan-
ners supporting countries that are transitioning from armed conflict or
civil strife to sustained stability.12 The section titled Legal System Reform
recommends legal system reorganization, code and statutory reform,
increased citizen participation, and institutional reform. Initial recom-
mended responses include developing strategies to rebuild criminal justice
systems and identifying countries that can serve as models and sources of
expertise.13 In 2006, the African Union issued its own Policy on Post-Con-
flict Reconstruction and Development (the Policy).14 Recognizing that post-
conflict environments are often characterized by institutional breakdown
and the collapse of law and normative frameworks, the Policy seeks to
address the root causes of conflict effectively and emphasizes the exigency
of reestablishing the Rule of Law.15
During the same period, similar recommendations were made by
scholars and practitioners engaged in post-conflict reconstruction. Jane
Stromseth, examining reconstruction efforts following military interven-
tions, argued that building a legitimate legal system should be a vital aspect
of post-conflict reconstruction efforts and stressed that it must be
addressed expeditiously.16 In the same vein, Kleinfeld proposed a shift
away from institution-based definitions of Rule of Law reform, which com-
pare legal institutions to Western counterparts, toward an ends-based para-
11. Secretary of State Colin Powell created the Office of the Coordinator for Recon-
struction and Stabilization (S/CRS) on August 5, 2004 to enhance the U.S.' institutional
capacity to respond to crises involving failing, failed, and post-conflict states as well as
complex emergencies. The core mission of S/CRS was to lead, coordinate, and institu-
tionalize the U.S. Government's civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict
situations. The S/CRS was also meant to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in tran-
sition from conflict or civil strife so they could reach a sustainable path toward peace,
democracy, and a market economy. About S/CRS, U.S. DEP'T STATE, https://2001-
2009.state.gov/s/crs/c12936.htm [https://perma.cc/UUP2-MSJD (last visited Aug. 12,
2019). On November 22, 2011, the U.S. Department of State replaced S/CRS with the
Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. The mandate of the Bureau focuses on
political instability, countering violent extremism, and security sector stabilization,
which includes informing policies on detention, prosecution, or rehabilitation. Bureau
of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, U.S. DEP'T STATE, https://www.state.gov/
bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-civilian-security-democracy-and-human-rights/
bureau-of-conflict-and-stabilization-operations [https://perma.cc/B2AH-UA98] (last vis-
ited Aug. 12, 2019).
12. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Post-Conflict
Reconstruction Essentials Tasks Matrix, U.S. DEP'T STATE (Apr. 1, 2005), https://2001-
2009.state.gov/s/crs/rls/52959.htm [https://perma.cc/DH4J-3VS9].
13. Id.
14. See generally AFRICAN UNION, POLICY ON POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT (2006).
15. Id. ¶ 5.
16. JANE STROMSETH ET AL., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF LAw
AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 178, 192 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
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digm that permits reformers to focus on the delivery of effective justice.17
This Article begins by analyzing the nexus and intersection between
legal systems and conflict in several historical contexts. It then examines
issues raised during legal system reform that are exacerbated by their prox-
imity to conflict and discusses the role of international actors and their
agendas-both overt and covert-in Rule of Law work. Finally, this Article
proposes a problem-solving model that utilizes a Comparative Law
approach for post-conflict reconstruction. This model is not limited by
traditional boundaries of legal system theory but instead seeks to address
specific legal deficits that contribute to conflict and considers component
aspects of various legal systems as a solution to conflict.
1. Conflict and Legal Systems
Intersections between laws, legal systems, and conflicts are not new,
and they are not likely to disappear.18 A brief survey of several past, post-
conflict reconstruction processes conveys this observation.
A. Germany
Legal system reform has intersected with conflict since at least 1948,
when Germany's entire legal system was restructured by advisers from the
Allied Powers who determined that legislation infused with National
Socialist principles had contributed to World War II. At the war's conclu-
sion, these advisers set out to purge the legal system of Hitler's policies,
which synchronized justice with Nazi ideologies.19 The task, however,
turned out to be more complicated than advisers initially realized. Because
the Nazi regime followed German positivist tradition, a large amount of
legislation had been enacted to ensure that judges would have positive law
to follow.20 Denazification required that every aspect of the German legal
system-including seemingly neutral areas such as corporate, family, insur-
ance, patent, agricultural, and public health law-be examined not only for
language, but also for impact: "a task of truly Justinian proportions."21
The process was made more difficult by the diverse legal backgrounds of
the advisers, who spoke and wrote in different languages.22
17. KLEINFELD, supra note 5, at 12-17.
18. In Syria, for example, legal reform has already been identified as a critical aspect
of future reconstruction efforts since the system's intimacy with the current government
has resulted in a loss of legitimacy. See ILAC Report, supra note 2, at 9.
19. Andrew Szenajda, Restoring Administrations of Justice in Early Practice: American-
Occupied Germany 1945-1949, AMSTERDAM L.F., Winter 2014, at 35, 39.
20. Karl Loewenstein, Law and the Legislative Process in Occupied Germany: I, 57
YALE LJ. 724, 734-35 (1948).
21. Id. at 734. The enormity of challenges involved in post-conflict reconstruction
appears to attract historical superlatives. Hansjoerg Strohmeyer describes the challenges
facing legal advisers in Timor-Leste immediately following the 1999 conflict as "truly
Promethean." Hansjoerg Strohmeyer, Building a New Judiciary for East Timor: Challenges
of a Fledgling Nation, 11 CRIM. L.F. 259, 262 (2000).
22. Loewenstein, supra note 20, at 743-44.
301
Cornell International Law Journal
B. Japan
In post-World War II Japan, system change was just as deliberate and
thorough as it was in Germany. Under the orders of the Supreme Com-
mander for the Allied Powers, a bold, neocolonial plan to entirely recon-
figure Japanese law was conceived and undertaken despite the
acknowledged realization that enduring political and social revolutions
should emanate from within indigenous societies.2 3 In addition to abolish-
ing the government-sponsored cult of Shinto, liberalizing the constitution,
extending franchise to women, promoting labor unionization, and democ-
ratizing the economy, all civil and criminal laws were reformed over the
course of two years as part of an overt effort to eliminate all vestiges of
previous Japanese society.24 These legal reforms did not sit well with pow-
erful Japanese elites who would have preferred to ignore root causes of
militarism, repression, and aggression by simply depicting the war as an
aberration.25
C. Latin America
The relationship between legal systems and conflict in Latin America
is stark. Civil code systems were introduced throughout Latin America
during periods of colonization.2 6 One scholar goes so far as to state that
Latin America's colonial past has left it more burdened than many other
developing regions of the globe because of "autocratic caprices of Iberian
monarchies [who] pillaged a fertile and abundant land for the sake of relig-
ious zealousness and strategic hegemony over other Old World rivals."27
More than five hundred years later, colonial and post-colonial governments
and economies in Latin America, founded on mercantile systems with no
interest in representative democracy, still favored elitist governmental
structures in which the elite accumulated wealth and entrenched them-
selves in positions of power and influence.28 Ultimately, conflict, violence,
and uprisings erupted in many of these Latin American countries.
In the late 1980s and 1990s, reform of Latin American legal systems
was of great interest to human rights activists, policy makers, and interna-
tional funders because corruption of the judiciary, police, and other insti-
tutions caused loss of faith in justice systems. In Guatemala and Colombia,
abuses of the secret investigation phase-a hallmark of civil code systems-
were linked to astronomical rates of impunity, rampant corruption, brib-
23. JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II DEFEAT 80
(1999).
24. Id. at 82.
25. Dower states: "On their own, these civilian elites might have conducted a mild
post-war purge of military leaders and perhaps instituted some small political reforms
aimed at preventing military excesses in the future." Id. at 84.
26. See generally Nagle, supra note 1.
27. Id. at 348.
28. Id.
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ery, and violence.2 9 In 1994, reforms of the Guatemalan criminal law and
procedure codes were part of an effort to recover from thirty-six years of
civil war and a legacy of oppressive military rule.3 0 In both countries,
inquisitorial processes were abandoned in favor of adversarial features that
promised increased transparency and fewer opportunities for corruption.31
D. Cambodia
Although the legal system of Cambodia has been influenced through-
out history by a variety of other systems, including early influences from
India3 2 and France, the Khmer Rouge period of 1975-197933 left behind a
very specific legal legacy. The Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), or
Khmer Rouge, abolished all laws and institutions and ruled through a cen-
tral dictatorship that exercised complete control over every aspect of its
citizens' lives.34 All but a small handful of people were killed-regardless
of their level of education.35 Following the signing of the Paris Peace
Accords in 1991, a period of reconstruction began that included the partic-
ipation of international advisers. The 1993 constitution, drafted with
international assistance, preserved the validity of previously enacted legis-
lation to the extent that such legislation was not inconsistent with the con-
stitution itself.3 6 Therefore, although there were no positive law remnants
of the CPK implicated in the conflict, their complete absence, along with
the fact that almost every lawyer had been killed, left a post-conflict legacy
that had never existed elsewhere. Post-conflict reconstruction was further
29. Andres Torres, From Inquisitorial to Accusatory: Colombia and Guatemala's Legal
Transition 2-4 (Law & Justice in the Americas Working Paper Series, Paper No. 4, 2007),
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ljawps/4 [https://perma.cc/HNQ8-VUCY].
30. Id. at 1.
31. Id. at 6. Whether these legal system reforms were successful and whether they
contributed to successful transitions to peace in Latin America remains an open ques-
tion. Commentators still characterize the Colombian justice system as chaotic and cor-
rupt. See Hermdn Gutierrez, Colombia: Overview of Corruption and Anti-corruption,
TRANSPARENCY INT'L (Mar. 15, 2003), https://www.transparency.org/files/content/cor-
ruptiongas/373_ColombiaOverview_of_corruptionand_anti-corruption.pdf [https://
perma.cc/R5SY-CG3K]. Some believe that reforms did not transform state institutions
into embracing disaffected groups and reducing rates of impunity; instead, elite groups
continue to use justice systems to "reward followers, ensure the outcomes of certain
distributive decisions, and otherwise enhance the political advantage of one partisan
faction or another." Nagle, supra note 1, at 354 (quoting LINN A. HAMMERGREN, THE
POLrrICS OF JUSTICE AND JUsTICE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA: THE PERUVIAN CASE IN COMPAR-
ATIVE PERSPECTIVE 27 (1998)). In the end, Nagle wonders whether judicial reform efforts
are in fact responsible for the lack of socioeconomic development and persistent conflict
in Latin America. Id. at 346.
32. J6rg Menzel, Cambodian Law: Some Comparative and International Perspectives, in
INTRODUCTION TO CAMBODIAN LAw 479, 485 (Hor Peng et al. eds., 2012).
33. Jennifer Holligan & Tarik Abdulhak, Overview of the Cambodian History, Govern-
ance and Legal Sources, GLOBALEx (Apr. 2011), https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/
Cambodia.html#postdkperiod [https://perma.cc/WD5E-MPSR].
34. Id.
35. See Menzel, supra note 32, at 1; Janet Vo, Note, Breaking the Cycle: Shifting
Towards Effective Education Reform to Overcome Poverty and Abate Cambodia's Sex Indus-
try, 39 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 455, 455 (2016).
36. Holligan & Abdulhak, supra note 33.
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complicated by the fact that Cambodians were deeply reluctant to use state-
sponsored legal forums due to their "dislike for adversarial dispute resolu-
tion, distrust of the state, and a strong cultural tradition of turning to
monks and those higher in the social hierarchy for resolution of dis-
putes."3 7 Since law had not protected them from the tyranny of the Khmer
Rouge, the general public felt little but contempt for the Rule of Law and
legal system.38
E. Kosovo
In Kosovo, longstanding ethnic discrimination and tension functioned
as a primary impetus for violence.3 9 In 1999, ethnic cleansing by Serbs
against Kosovar Albanians and airstrikes by NATO were followed by Secur-
ity Council Resolution 1244 establishing a United Nations Transitional
Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). 4 0 Since ethnic Albanians had not par-
ticipated in the justice system during the period of Serbian control,4 ' the
subsequent withdrawal of Serbian military and police left virtually no
trained justice sector personnel and a significant question as to what law
would apply in criminal, land title, and other cases.4 2 The decision of Spe-
cial Representative of the Secretary General Bernard Kouchner to restore
the legal framework that had been in place prior to the NATO intervention
was deeply resented by ethnic Albanians, who considered those laws sym-
bolic of Serbian oppression.43 Even though none of the laws were facially
discriminatory, they had been applied by Slobodan Milosevic in a discrimi-
natory manner and were considered to have been among the most powerful
tools of repression and discrimination during the years of Serbian con-
trol.4 4 Thus, Kouchner's decision received significant backlash, which
made it impossible to initiate any sort of legal proceeding. Ultimately,
UNMIK was compelled to issue a new regulation declaring that the applica-
ble legal framework would be the one in place prior to the date Serbian
control had begun, even though those laws were far less protective of inter-
national human rights norms than the so-called "Serb laws."4 5
37. Dolores A. Donovan, Cambodia: Building A Legal System from Scratch, 27 INT'L
LAw. 445, 454 (1993).
38. See id. at 453.
39. SETH G. JONES ET AL., ESTABLISHING LAW AND ORDER AFTER CONFLICT 28 (2005).
40. STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 16, at 37.
41. During this period, Kosovar Albanians turned to traditional alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms to resolve disputes. Using village elders, Reconciliation Coun-
cils solved approximately one thousand longstanding blood feuds during the 1990s. See
U.S. AGENCY INT'L DEv. ET AL., JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT MISSION 11 4 (2001).
42. See STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 16, at 316.
43. Id. at 316-17; see also Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a
Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'L L.
46, 56-59 (2001).
44. MICHAEL E. HARTMANN, INTERNATIONAL JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS IN Kosovo: A
NEW MODEL FOR POST-CONFLICT PEACEKEEPING 4 (2003); see also Strohmeyer, supra note
43, at 58-59.
45. See STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 16, at 317.
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F. Timor-Leste
In 1999, the people of Timor-Leste took advantage of Indonesian Presi-
dent B.J. Habibie's offer to participate in a referendum to determine the
future of their country, which had been subject to colonization for more
than five hundred years-first by Portugal and later by Indonesia.46 On the
day of the referendum, 98% of eligible Timorese voters cast ballots.47
When the results of the referendum were announced, 78.5% of the popula-
tion had voted for independence, rejecting Indonesia's offer of autonomy.48
Immediately following the referendum, Indonesian military forces and pro-
integration militias launched a campaign of violence, looting, and arson
throughout the country.4 9 When the U.N. established the U.N. Transi-
tional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), it gave UNTAET executive,
legislative, and judicial authority.5 0
During its initial assessment, UNTAET found that virtually all trained
lawyers had fled Timor during the post-referendum violence.51 Since the
Timorese had not been permitted to participate in their own government
institutions during the centuries of colonization, very few judicial and
prosecutorial personnel remained, and none of them had any courtroom
experience.5 2
In its first regulation, implemented in accord with its legislative man-
date, UNTAET stated that Indonesian laws that had been in effect in East
Timor prior to October 25, 1999, would remain in effect to the extent they
were not inconsistent with international human rights standards or subse-
quent UNTAET regulations.53 However, as UNTAET's Deputy Principal
Legal Adviser found, Indonesian laws were politically charged and unac-
ceptable to the Timorese, almost all of whom had lost family members dur-
ing the struggle for independence.54
46. Louis Aucoin & Michele Brandt, East Timor's Constitutional Passage to Indepen-
dence, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSrnON: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAK-
ING 245, 246 (Laurel E. Miller & Louis Aucoin eds., 2010); see also Susan Harris Rimmer
& Juli Effi Tomaras, Aftermath Timor Leste: Reconciling Competing Notions of Justice, PAR-
LIAMENT AUSTL. (May 22, 2006), https://www.aph.gov.au/About Parliament/Parliamen-
taryDepartments/ParliamentaryLibrary/PublicationsArchive/archive/TimorLeste
[https://perma.cc/Z9XJ-76QG].
47. United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor: Background, UNrTED




50. Aucoin & Brandt, supra note 46, at 249.
51. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in
East Timor, Y 33, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1024 (Oct. 4, 1999); see also Strohmeyer, supra note
21, at 262-63.
52. Strohmeyer, supra note 21, at 269.
53. Id. at 267.
54. See Strohmeyer, supra note 43, at 48. Opposition to former tools of Indonesian
control was further enflamed by the final report of the Commission for Reception, Truth
and Reconciliation, titled Chegal. The report alleged that the Indonesian military had
used napalm and poisoned food supplies to kill members of the resistance movement. It
also accused the military of using rape, sexual slavery, and sexual violence to inflict
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Timor's complex legal history, the result of centuries of colonization
and periods of intense violence, led to widespread mistrust of formal laws
and legal institutions and an ongoing preference for traditional legal prac-
tices.55 Reluctance on the part of government leaders, including the Prime
Minister, to follow formal laws is cited as a cause of ongoing violence in the
country.56
II. Legal System Reform: A Fraught Enterprise Under the Best of
Circumstances
It is not surprising that in none of the past, post-conflict cases dis-
cussed above was legal system reform carried out in a straightforward man-
ner. Law is more than just a body of state-sponsored rules and institutions,
and reforming a legal system requires more than merely redrafting legisla-
tion. Law reflects a deeply complex collection of cultural commitments
and institutional structures valued by those within its jurisdiction.57
When undertaken organically and willingly, legal reform can bring about
welcomed changes accompanied by a legitimacy necessary to facilitate suc-
cess. For example, in Indonesia in 1998, following the downfall of
Suharto, changes to the Code of Criminal Procedure were initiated in pur-
suit of a "reformasi era of democracy and political reform."5 8
Success, however, is not always guaranteed. Even in comparatively sta-
ble regions such as Europe, where dangers associated with conquest and
colonialism are largely absent and proposed reforms have been organically
terror and hopelessness among pro-independence supporters. Rimmer & Tomaras,
supra note 46.
55. Peter Broderick et al., Legal History and the Rule of Law in Timor-Leste 21 (Stan-
ford L. Sch. Rule of L. Program, Working Paper, 2013), https://law.stanford.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/Legal-History-and-the-Rule-of-Law-in-Timor-Leste.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/YK4P-8SEX; see also Access to Justice Brief: Legal Assistance in Timor-Leste,
COUNTERPART INT'L 1, 8 (2014), https://www.counterpart.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/10/ENG-Legal-Aid-Assessment.pdf [https://perma.cc/33NP-Y2W4] [hereinafter
Access to Justice Brief]. A complex land title system, the product of Portuguese and Indo-
nesian occupation, was a major source of conflict in 2006-2007. Many of the titles
issued by both occupiers turned out to be fraudulent. It was estimated that, after 1999,
only approximately 4.7% of land had clear title and approximately 50% of houses were
illegally occupied. See James Scambary, Anatomy of a Conflict: The 2006-2007 Commu-
nal Violence in East Timor, 9 CONFLICT, SEC. & DEV. 265, 276 (2009).
56. Geoffrey Robinson, East Timor Ten Years On: Legacies of Violence, 70 J. ASIAN
STUD. 1007, 1007 (2011).
57. STROMsETH ET AL., supra note 16, at 4. Legal culture is defined by Lawrence M.
Friedman as the "ideas, values, expectations and attitudes towards law and legal institu-
tions, which some public or some parts of the public holds." Lawrence M. Friedman,
The Concept of Legal Culture: A Reply, in COMPARING LEGAL CULTUREs 33, 34 (David
Nelken ed., 1997). Werner Menski expands on this idea, arguing that any discussion
about whether law is a universal phenomenon is doomed from the start because there is
no methodology or uniform definition of law. For example, even simple societies can be
considered to have law if the overriding principle of such law is to avoid disputes and
legal institutions at all costs. See WERNER MENsim, COMPARATIVE LAw IN A GLOBAL CON-
TEXT: THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ASIA AND AFRICA 34 (2d ed. 2006).
58. Robert R. Strang, "More Adversarial, but Not Completely Adversarial": Reformasi
of the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 187, 202 (2008).
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driven, legal system reform has been a complicated endeavor. Loyalty to
Italian legal culture was the alleged reason prosecutors resisted 1989
reforms to the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure that were intended to
introduce adversarial features into a historically inquisitorial system.5 9
Similarly, efforts by French President Nicolas Sarkozy in 2009 to eliminate
the role of the Investigating Judge in criminal proceedings and transfer
investigative powers to prosecutors were met with intense opposition by
critics who argued that the proposed reforms ran counter to French values
and history and reflected Sarkozy's excessive fondness for Britain and the
United States.60
Practitioners may also resist reform for their own reasons. John H.
Langbein believes that even before Comparative Law entered the main-
stream academic arena, cultural differences were not the true reason for
reluctance by common law practitioners to engage with other legal systems.
Instead, he states that it was lawyers' vested interests, including-and per-
haps, especially-their financial interests, in maintaining control of court
proceedings that prevented system change.61
Legal system reform is perhaps most successful when changes are con-
sistent with aspects of the system that had previously been in place. In
Russia, juries were reintroduced in 2002 as part of the new Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure, which was adopted in order to shift the legal system away
from one that had maintained an overt prosecutorial bias and Soviet pri-
59. See William T. Pizzi & Mariangela Montagna, The Battle to Establish an Adver-
sarial Trial System in Italy, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 429, 430-31 (2004); see also Riccardo
Montana, Adversarialism in Italy: Using the Concept of Legal Culture to Understand Resis-
tance to Legal Modifications and Its Consequences, 20 EUR. J. CRIME CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST.
99, 102 (2012). In 1988, the Italian Parliament introduced a new Code of Criminal
Procedure (Code) that inserted adversarial features into a system that, until that point,
had been strongly inquisitorial. When the Constitutional Court invalidated sections of
the new Code, Parliament amended the Constitution, giving the accused protections that
mirrored those in adversarial systems. Twelve years after the new Code was enacted,
Parliament amended the Code once again to reflect the newly accrued panoply of consti-
tutional rights of the defense. Id. at 104.
60. See Bruce Crumley, Will France Americanize Its Legal System?, TIME MAG. Qan. 9,
2009), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1870443,00.html thttps://
perma.cc/XR6U-9S3K]; Lara Marlowe, Sarhozy's Reform of French Justice System Causes
Outcry, IRISH TIMES (Jan. 19, 2019), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/
sarkozy-s-reform-of-french-justice-system-causes-outcry-1.1235159 [https://perma.cc/
NB4X-8UWN]; French Criminal Justice: A Delicate Judgment, ECONOMIST (Sept. 10, 2009),
https://www.economist.com/europe/2009/09/10/a-delicate-judgment [https://
perma.cc/5ZNW-8F6V]. France's pride in its Civil Code dates back to Napoleon him-
self, who said: "My true glory is not to have won forty battles ... ; what nothing can
efface, what will endure forever, is my Civil Code." Alain A. Levasseur, The Conference:
Why?, 51 Loy. L. REv. 1, 1 (2005). Germany and Italy, in 1974 and 1988 respectively,
eliminated the role of the Investigating Judge with greater ease. See STEPHEN C. THAMAN,
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A CASEBOOK APPROACH 16 (2002).
61. John H. Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism in Comparative Law, 5 CARDOZOJ. INT'L &
CoMPAR. L. 41, 48 (1997). For reasons similar to those articulated by Langbein, Robert
Strang argues that common law systems, especially as practiced in the United States, are
not likely to adopt inquisitorial aspects of civil law criminal justice systems due to a
history of hostility for the inquisitorial system. Strang, supra note 58, at 192.
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macy of the state over the individual.62 However, juries were already famil-
iar to scholars of the Russian legal system because they had been
introduced in 1864 by Alexander II, although they were later abolished by
the Bolsheviks in 1917.63 Moreover, juries had been used in nine adminis-
trative regions of Russia since 1993.64
When legal system change takes place in proximity to conflict, com-
plexities are introduced that render transitions even more difficult. This is
especially true when aspects of the legal system were implicated in the con-
flict. Linkages between laws and conflict have been recognized by both
academics and practitioners who have actively worked in peacekeeping
missions.6 5 They are also recognized in the Brahimi Report, which
addresses the need for legal reform when pre-conflict systems have lost
legitimacy,66 and by the European Commission,6 7 which acknowledges
that ethnic and religious inequalities within justice systems can lead
directly to conflict.
III. The Role of International Advisers and the Question of Agendas
Post-conflict reconstruction frequently involves external advisers.
Especially in situations in which conflict has resulted in reduced levels-or
a complete absence-of legal expertise, external advisers are often called
upon to provide knowledge and experience lacking in conflict-affected set-
tings. A number of international organizations and regional and national
agencies-including the United Nations Development Programme, the
European and African Unions, the United States Agency for International
Development, the Danish International Development Agency, and the
Department for International Development in the United Kingdom-
engage in Rule of Law programming in post-conflict settings.6 8
62. Stephen C. Thaman, The Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia, 31 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 61, 63 (1995); see also Catherine Newcombe, Russian Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 397, 397 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007).
63. Nick Holdsworth, Russia Scraps Right to Jury Trial, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 12, 2008,
4:43 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/3725300/Rus-
sia-scraps-right-to-jury-trial.html [https://perma.cc/CCW3-3XCQ].
64. Newcombe, supra note 62, at 398.
65. See STROMsETH ET AL., supra note 16, at 178.
66. Brahimi Report, supra note 8, ¶I 79, 81.
67. See generally Joint Staff Working Document, supra note 7.
68. The multiple donors active in post-conflict settings can result in competing or
overlapping programming. For an example of challenges associated with donor coordi-
nation in Haiti, see Janice M. Stromsem & Joseph Trincellito, Building the Haitian
National Police: A Retrospective and Prospective View, in HATI PAPERS 1, 8 (Trinity Coll.
D.C., Haiti Program Ser. No. 6, 2003). Legal assistance provided by agencies from the
same country is not always coordinated smoothly. For example, although the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial
Development Assistance (OPDAT) are major U.S. actors in Rule of Law work, they do not
necessarily support the same agendas. USAID's developmental approach has histori-
cally emphasized the goal of building institutions that strengthen democracies and econ-
omies, while OPDAT tends to focus on reducing and eliminating criminal activity that
originates in other countries and makes its way to the United States. See Miximo
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Tom Carothers outlines four broad clusters of historical agendas in
Rule of Law assistance: democracy promotion, human rights and social
justice movements, economic development, and international law enforce-
ment.6 9 Each agenda is promoted by agencies and organizations with spe-
cific interests in it.70 Agendas are not always transparent, however. So-
called "failed laws" or "failed legal systems" may be used as pretexts to
reconfigure agendas for funders' tactical, political, or financial gain.71
Failed systems may also be viewed as opportunities for reform by external
advisers and activists who deem local laws to be culturally backwards or
economically regressive.72 In some cases, it has been suggested that it was
the convenience of peacekeepers, who were unfamiliar with indigenous sys-
tems and therefore unable or unwilling to engage with them, that justified
systemic change.73
The role of external advisers has evolved over time and has not been
free from controversy. During the process of legislative reform in post-war
Germany, conflicts arose among the four Allied powers and their German
counterparts due to competing national agendas and an almost complete
lack of familiarity with all aspects of German life. 74 In Cambodia, where
post-conflict reconstruction efforts required decisions about which legal
Langer, Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of Legal Ideas from the
Periphery, 55 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 617, 658 (2007).
69. Thomas Carothers, The Many Agendas of Rule of Law Reform in Latin America, in
RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA: THE INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION OF JUDICIAL REFORM 7-8
(P. Domingo & R. Sieder eds., 2001).
70. But see Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal
History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMPAR. L.
839, 845 (2003) ("Perhaps the central conclusion to arise from the failed law and devel-
opment projects of the 1960's and '70's was that the domestic dynamics of the recipient
are almost always far more relevant to the course of a [legal] transplant than the role of
the donor.").
71. Jorge L. Esquirol, The Failed Law of Latin America, 56 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 75, 79
(2008).
72. Controversially, Lan Cao argued that since culture plays a significant role in aid-
ing or obstructing economic development, he field of law and development should pur-
sue purposive cultural change. Cao states,
[a]s slippery a concept as culture may be and as complex and controversial as
the notion of culture change undoubtedly is, particularly given the history of
colonialism, I argue that we must enter the cultural milieu and ask whether cer-
tain cultural attributes in a given society are an impediment to that society's
economic development.. . . Law and development assistance must therefore con-
front even issues that seem to be part of a country's proclaimed cultural identity.
Lan Cao, Culture Change, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 357, 358 (2007).
73. Bruce M. Oswald, Model Codes for Criminal Justice and Peace Operations: Some
Legal Issues, 9 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 253, 260-61 (2004). Oswald explains that "[a]ny
changes to . . . law and procedure should be restricted to that which is necessary and
reasonable." Id. at 262. The ethics of engaging in legal system reform when there is no
legal basis is discussed by Allen Buchanan. See Allen Buchanan, From Nuremburg to
Kosovo: The Morality of Illegal International Legal Reform, 111 ETHICs 673, 674 (2001).
The author criticizes illegal reform, explaining that "what some hail as progress others
decry as illegal acts that threaten the rule of law, betray a lack of sincerity regarding
fidelity to law, and manifest a disturbing willingness to impose subjective, personal
moral standards on others." Id.
74. Loewenstein, supra note 20, at 740.
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system should serve as the basis for new legislation, conflicts between
Khmer and international advisers, and among advisers from common law
and civil code systems, initially hampered efforts to reestablish the Rule of
Law.75
Although contributions by international advisers may inevitably result
in inadvertent influences from their own legal backgrounds,76 scenarios in
which advisers view collapsed systems as "clean slates," or tabula rasa, that
provide possibilities for creating legal orders from scratch are more prob-
lematic. 7 7 In one troubling case, a legal adviser opined:
[International actors should carefully analyze the culture, circumstances
and needs of the state in question and, . . . construct the most suitable legal
order.
In the context of state-building, not only must one successfully create a
legal system that is theoretically functional, but one must then teach this
system to a country of lawyers, judges, and legal personnel that have, up to
that point in their legal existence, conceived of law and legal practice
differently. 78
A more ethical role for legal advisers in post-conflict reconstruction
efforts is proposed by Louis Aucoin, who advocates respect for the sover-
75. CORBIN LYDAY & JAN STROMSEM, USAID, REBUILDING THE RULE OF LAW IN POsT-
CONFLIcT ENVIRONMENTs 15 (2005); see also Kong Phallack, Overview of the Cambodian
Legal and Judicial System, in INTRODUcTION TO CAMBODIAN LAw, supra note 32, at 7, 17.
"The current legal system is a hybrid legal system, which is an amalgamation of
Cambodian customs, the French based legal system (an influence from French coloniza-
tion), and the common law system, which is an influence arising from foreign aid assis-
tance to legal and judicial reform in Cambodia." Id. at 8.
76. The contributions of international advisers to post-conflict reconstruction
processes in Cambodia have introduced influences from Vietnam, Japan, France, and
various common law systems. Menzel, supra note 32, at 482-83.
77. Nicolas Lemay-Hebert, The "Empty Shell" Approach: The Setup Process of Interna-
tional Administrations in Timor-Leste and Kosovo, Its Consequences and Lessons, 12 INT'L
STUD. PERsP. 190, 195 (2011). In 1999, Xanana Gusmao, leader of the Timorese revolu-
tion against Indonesian occupation, said: "we don't feel very comfortable with some
people acting like kings of East Timor, coming here to impose their models .... " Id. at
203. Later, Samantha Power recounted a scenario in which Xanana Gusmao had occa-
sion to receive advice from Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, another political leader
who had lived through a U.N. transitional administration. SAMANTHA POwER, CHASING
THE FLAME: SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO AND THE FIGHT TO SAVE THE WORLD 299 (2008).
While standing in line to enter a reception hosted by President Bill Clinton at the Metro-
politan Museum of Art, Hun Sen warned Gusmao about U.N. involvement. The warning
proved justified when Gusmao returned to Timor and learned that, under Resolution
1272, a transitional administration had been created for Timor-Leste, delegating "all leg-
islative and executive authority . .. to a foreign U.N. administrator who would run East
Timor for at least fifteen months." Id. at 300 (citations omitted). After a significant
percentage of Timor's population had lost their lives in pursuit of independence, the
terms of Resolution 1272 were not welcome news. Id.
78. Dan E. Stigall, Comparative Law and State-Building: The "Organic Minimalist"
Approach to Legal Reconstruction, 29 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMPAR. L. REV. 1, 18, 22 (2007).
The "Empty Shell" approach is also criticized by Bruce M. Oswald as a return to the
doctrine of terra nullius, which is based on the idea that territory occupied by another
state is inhabited by people who have no social or political organization. Oswald, supra
note 73, at 261.
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eign right of indigenous actors to select legal and constitutional models
from an array of options presented by advisers with backgrounds in Com-
parative Law.7 9
Traditional North-South development models, in which advisers from
the global North provide advice to recipients in the global South, have
come under attack in recent years since they tend to perpetuate colonial
power imbalances and place countries in the southern hemisphere in posi-
tions of dependency. More recent South-South cooperative models, in
which members of the global South share experiences and lessons learned
with members of other countries in the southern hemisphere, are meant to
provide expressions of solidarity among developing countries.8 0 South-
South cooperative models may also enhance legitimacy among recipient
communities since they do not carry the stigmas associated with
colonization.8 1
IV. Applicable Legal Frameworks
Because legality is linked to perceptions of legitimacy in local popula-
tions, establishing a valid legal basis for legal system reform is important in
post-conflict settings. Laws introduced by external legal advisers will have
little chance of success if they are believed to have been imposed illegally.
Applicable legal bases will depend on the circumstances in which reform is
undertaken.
A. Frameworks During Occupation
The governing legal frameworks of occupation are set forth in the
1907 Hague Convention and the Fourth Geneva Convention.8 2 Article 43
of the 1907 Hague Convention imposes two obligations on an occupying
79. See generally Louis Aucoin, The Role of International Experts in Constitution-Mak-
ing: Myth and Reality, 5 GEO. J. INT'L APT. 89 (2004). This approach is mirrored by
Corbin Lyday and Jan Stromsem who recommend that U.S. advisers not write new
codes, but rather advise and comment local officials in the reform process. See LYDAY &
STROMSEM, supra note 75, at 15-16.
80. Silvia Lopez Cabana, Chronology and History of South-South Cooperation: An
Ibero-American Contribution 9-10 (lbero-Am. Programme for the Strengthening of South-
South Cooperation, Working Paper No. 5, 2014), https://www.segib.org/wp-content/
uploads/Chrono-South-South2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AUC-X6P4].
81. See Langer, supra note 68, at 661-62. Drawing upon gift theory, previously con-
fined to analyses of Western foreign aid, at least one scholar has criticized South-South
development models as discursively constructing the "aid" element of South-South devel-
opment cooperation. Emma Mawdsley argues that euphemistic, Southern cooperative
models obscure contested subnational politics of development and growing differences
among G77 nations. Her analysis focuses on "the ways in which Southern development
actors represent a challenge to the dominant aid paradigm, transgressing dominant cul-
tural categories and social hierarchies of who gives and who receives," refusing to take
claims of South-South solidarity and mutual benefit at face value. See generally Emma
Mawdsley, The Changing Geographies of Foreign Aid and Development Cooperation: Con-
tributions from Gift Theory, 37 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 256 (2012).
82. Occupation and International Humanitarian Law: Questions and Answers, INT'L
COMM. RED CROSS (Apr. 8, 2004), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/
misc/634kfc.htm [https://perma.cc/LE7A-XG5B].
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power: "(a) to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and life in
the occupied territory; [and] (b) to respect the laws in force in the occupied
territory unless an 'empechement absolu' exists."83 In general, Article 43 is
interpreted to mean that an occupying power must maintain the laws of the
occupied territory at the time of occupation in place to the extent possible.
However, given the occupying power's concomitant responsibility to restore
and ensure public order and life, it is generally understood that the preex-
isting legal system can be modified through new legislation when a neces-
sity arises.84 Any change made to the legal system deemed necessary by
the occupying power only applies during actual occupation, "unless a
returning territorial sovereign" elects to keep it intact.8 5
Article 64 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention outlines three cir-
cumstances under which an occupying power may suspend or repeal the
existing laws of the state and enact new legislation as necessity demands:
"to fulfill its obligations under the ... Convention, to maintain the orderly
government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying
Power."8 6 Although Article 47 of this Convention permits an occupying
power to suspend, repeal, or change existing law, inhabitants may not be
deprived of the protections of international law.8 7
B. Frameworks During Peacekeeping Operations
Bruce M. Oswald examines the legality of engaging in any type of sys-
tem reform outside occupation contexts and states that in almost every
case, "it is the domestic law of the host state" that applies during
peacekeeping operations.88 The exception is when "domestic law ... does
not comply with internationally accepted standards."89 The rationale for
this principle is that all states are sovereign, and interference in their
domestic lawmaking powers should only be undertaken by exception.
In some contexts, however, preexisting legal frameworks have been
discredited or rejected by local populations, especially when they are
linked to the conflict itself.90 Timor-Leste, discussed above, is one exam-
ple. Following the 1999 uprising against Indonesian occupiers, the contin-
ued legitimacy of Indonesian law, which had previously been applied in
83. Yoram Dinstein, Legislation Under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations: Belligerent
Occupation and Peacebuilding, in OccASIONAL PAPER SERIES 2, 3 (HCPR Ser. No. 1, 2004).
84. Id. at 4.
85. Id. at 5.
86. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
art. 64, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
87. Commentary of 1958, INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=OpenDocument&documentId-C4712FE71392
AFE1C12563CD0042C34A [https://perma.cc/7CV7-ZD7J] (last visited Aug. 13, 2019)
(commenting on Article 47 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War).
88. Oswald, supra note 73, at 260.
89. Id. For a discussion of ethical considerations when engaging in unfounded,
legal system reform, see generally Buchanan, supra note 73.
90. Oswald, supra note 73, at 272.
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Timor-Leste, evaporated.9 1
When legal system reform is undertaken, international law provides
only broad guidelines and does not express preference for any specific
legal system over others. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
many provisions of which have been incorporated into customary interna-
tional law and are therefore binding on all countries,92 requires only that
tribunals be "independent and impartial" and that trials be "fair and pub-
lic." 93 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
binding on countries that are party to it, similarly requires that trials be
"fair and public" and carried out by "competent, independent and impar-
tial tribunal[s] established by law."9 4 Language in the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights is almost identical, requiring "a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law." 95
Fair trial rights in the African Union are more specific.96 Such rights
require "a fair and public hearing by a legally constituted[,] competent,
independent[,] and impartial judicial body,"9 7 and include:
(a) equality of arms between the parties to the proceeding, whether they be
administrative, civil, criminal, or military; (b) equality of all persons before
any judicial body without any distinction whatsoever as regards race, color,
ethnic origin, sex, gender, age, religion, creed, language, political or other
convictions, national or social origin, means, disability, birth, status or
other circumstances;98 (c) equality of access by women and men to judicial
bodies and equality before the law in any legal proceedings; (d) respect for
the inherent dignity of the human person, especially of women who partici-
pate in legal proceedings as complainants, witnesses, victims or accused; (e)
adequate opportunity to prepare a case, present arguments and evidence and
to challenge or respond to opposing arguments or evidence; (f) an entitle-
ment to consult and be represented by a legal representative or other quali-
fied persons chosen by the party at all stages of the proceedings; (g) an
entitlement to the assistance of an interpreter if he or she cannot understand
or speak the language used in or by the judicial body; (h) an entitlement to
91. See discussion supra Section I.F.
92. Hurst Hannum, The UDHR in National and International Law, HEALTH & Hum.
RTs., 1998, at 144, 145.
93. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 10 (Dec. 10,
1948).
94. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
95. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
6, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on
Human Rights].
96. Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa,
AFR. COMM'N HUM. & PEOPLE'S RTs. 1, 1-2 (2003), https://www.achpr.org/legalinstru-
ments/detail?id=38 [https://perma.cc/99VU-UJM6] [hereinafter African Principles &
Guidelines].
97. Id. at 1.
98. Although sexual orientation is protected in a number of European conventions,
similar protections do not exist in the African Union. Compare, e.g., Treaty Establishing
the European Community art. 13, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 OJ. (C 325) 151, with African
Principles & Guidelines, supra note 96, at 1-2.
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have a party's rights and obligations affected only by a decision based solely
on evidence presented to the judicial body; (i) an entitlement to a determina-
tion of their rights and obligations without undue delay and with adequate
notice of and reasons for the decisions; and (j) an entitlement to an appeal to
a higher judicial body.99
Article 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights essentially
mirrors language of the ICCPR and the European Convention on Human
Rights with the important addition of an "inalienable right to be assisted by
counsel provided by the state, paid or not as domestic law provides, if the
accused does not defend himself personally or engage his own counsel
within the time period established by law."' 00
The international legal framework's flexibility is reflected in the Secre-
tary General's report, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict
and Post-Conflict Societies. The report specifies that the normative founda-
tion for the United Nations' promulgation of the Rule of Law consists of
the U.N. Charter and the four pillars of the modern international law sys-
tem.' 0 ' These guidelines accommodate the full range of member states'
legal systems, whether they are based on common law, civil law, Islamic
law, or other legal traditions, and are designed to provide the legitimacy
that legal transplants from individual countries cannot. In other words,
these norms and standards bring a legitimacy that cannot be said to attach
to exported national models which, all too often, reflect more the individual
interests or experience of donors and assistance providers than they do the
best interests or legal development needs of host countries.
10 2
V. Which Legal System? A Comparative Approach
Even when well trained in principles of public international law, and
despite best intentions, international legal advisers-a large number of
whom are from Western countries-who are deployed to assist in post-con-
flict reconstruction processes often suffer from a lack of training in legal
systems other than their own.10 3 Because of this, the latitude provided by
99. African Principles & Guidelines, supra note 96, at 2.
100. American Convention on Human Rights art. 8(2)(e), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36.
101. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and
Post-Conflict Societies, 1 9, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter The Rule
of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies]. The four pillars are:
"international human rights law; international humanitarian law; international criminal
law; and international refugee law." Id.
102. Id. l 10.
103. In a recent article, Theresa Kaiser-Jarvis reports that "[florty-four percent of law-
yers admitted to a U.S. state bar in 2000 dealt with clients from outside the U.S. or with
cross-border issues during the 2006-2007 calendar year." Theresa Kaiser-Jarvis, Prepar-
ing Students for Global Practice: Developing Competencies and Providing Guidance, 67 J.
LEGAL EDUc. 949, 950 (2018). And that "more than sixty percent of lawyers in large
firms, corporations, legal services offices, and public defender offices report[ed] that
they solved global legal issues during their sixth year of practice." Id. But despite these
numbers, it is uncommon for U.S. law schools to offer courses in the laws of other
countries, which would prepare students for a global legal practice. Id. Kaiser-Jarvis
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international law with respect to choice of legal systems is not necessarily a
recommends that law students "gain familiarity with a legal system other than the com-
mon law" system, which is practiced exclusively in only "twenty-three of the United
Nations' 192 member states." Id. at 956.
William T. Pizzi offers a similar outlook, stating that Americans need a new "perspec-
tive on [the American] trial system . .. because an American legal education is very
narrow in its focus.... Students become familiar with American statutes, regulations,
decisional law, and the American trial system. Other legal traditions are ignored." WIL-
LIAM T. PIzzi, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH: WHY OUR SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL TRIALS HAS BECOME
AN EXPENSIVE FAILURE, AND WHAT WE NEED TO DO TO REBUILD IT 90 (1999).
Academic myopia with respect to Comparative Law is not an exclusive problem of the
United States. In 2000, a French law professor submitted a report to the Minister of
Education and Research denouncing the poor status of Comparative Law in France and
calling for the creation of comparative law studies. Benedicte Fauvarque-Cosson, Devel-
opment of Comparative Law in France, in THE OxFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW
29, 43 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2d ed. 2019).
Mere academic disinterest in other legal systems can morph into outright hostility in
the political arena. In one of his books, Justice Stephen Breyer recounts efforts by
elected officials in 2004 to restrict judicial determinations regarding the meaning of
laws of the United States, stating that such determinations should not be based in whole
or in part on judgments or laws of other countries. STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE
WORLD: AMERICAN LAw AND THE NEw GLOBAL REALITIES 238 (2015). A sponsoring mem-
ber of the House of Representatives also proposed that judges who deliberately violated
the legislation should be subject to impeachment. Id. at 334; see also Appropriate Role of
Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing on H. Res. 568 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, 108th Cong. 42-44 (2004) (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nad-
ler) (quoting Rep. Tom Feeney); Steven G. Calabresi, "A Shining City on a Hill": American
Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court's Practice of Relying on Foreign Laws, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 1335, 1337 (2006); Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, the Law of Nations, and
Citations of Foreign Law: The Lessons of History, 95 CAL. L. REv. 1335, 1336 (2007); Mark
Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better than Knowing More? Unpacking the Controversy
over Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1277 (2006);
Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARv. L. REv. 129, 132
(2005); Justices Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, & Stephen Breyer,
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Discussion at the American University Washington
College of Law: Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions (Jan. 13, 2005),
https://www.c-span.org/video/? 185122-1/constitutional-relevance-foreign-court-deci-
sions [https://perma.cc/R3MQ-VD3C] (Justices Scalia and Breyer debating the merits of
citing foreign law, with Justice Breyer arguing in favor and Justice Scalia arguing against).
In Europe, the Comparative Law methodology is widely accepted. Bodies such as the
European Court of Justice and the Venice Commission routinely compare national laws
of member states when creating jurisprudence and rendering advisory opinions. See
Koen Lenaerts & Kathleen Gutman, The Comparative Law Method and the European Court
of Justice: Echoes Across the Atlantic, 64 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 841, 844 (2016); see also, e.g.,
Opinion of the European Commission for Democracy Through Law on the Provisions Relat-
ing to Political Prisoners in the Amnesty Law of Georgia, at 4 (Mar.9, 2013), https://
www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2013)009-e
[https://perma.cc/X7SH-V5WB]. Moreover, an advisers' lack of familiarity with other
legal systems can raise ethical questions about their work. Stromseth and Kleinfeld
directly address the question of whether legal system reform carried out by external
advisers constitutes a form of imperialism or neocolonialism. KLEINFELD, supra note 5,
at 37-58; STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 16, at 1-17. Menski is especially critical of those
who pay "lip service ... to social influences on law" but still hold the presumption that
"progressive initiatives should come from the West." MENSKI, supra note 57, at 48. Men-
ski argues that this practice "ultimately den[ies] non-European legal cultures the capac-
ity and the chance to develop on their own terms." Id.
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benefit.104 Too often advisers' ignorance about other legal systems cause
them to default unwittingly into chauvinistic preferences for their own sys-
tems and soapboxes, advocating universality.105 This Article suggests that
a background in Comparative Law should be a prerequisite for anyone
engaged in legal system reform.
Although scholars differ as to the date Comparative Law emerged as a
discipline,106 virtually all agree that the field is now evolving rapidly and
achieving increased prominence, in large part because of the Europeaniza-
tion of law and globalizing trends in contemporary life.
107 Opinions about
which systems should be included in the field have also shifted over genera-
tions. For example, early scholars tended to focus on Western systems to
the exclusion of others10 8 or to mislabel non-Western systems.1
0 9 Colin
Picker finds darker motives for comparatists' preferences for Western legal
systems, arguing that some comparatists simply view non-Western systems
104. Gaps in existing legal frameworks can provide opportunities for advocates to
create legal protections without violating either international or domestic law. For
example, in countries in Southeast Asia, where laws do not explicitly identify time
frames for the attachment of legal rights to representation, human rights advocates have
successfully introduced norms authorizing defense counsel to begin representing
accused persons immediately upon arrest. Interview with Sanjeewa Liyanage, Int'l Pro-
gram Dir., Int'l Bridges to Justice, in Nyaung Shwe, Myan (Aug. 5, 2019).
105. Menski asks, "to what extent globalisation means harmonisation or even global
uniformisation of laws, rather than glocalisation or global pluralism"? He states that the
idea of creating a universal legal order draws students to international law courses. But
it is questionable whether universalization is an appropriate response to the multiple
impacts of globalization. MENSKI, supra note 57, at 38. Menski also argues that global-
ization "sits uneasily with [the] recognition of legal diversity." Id. at 39 (critiquing Rene
David and John E.C. Brierley). Perspectives on universality may be shifting away from
the declining influence of the United States and its legal system, and toward the increas-
ing influence of the "BRIC States," composed of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. See
Sean Butler, Visions of World Order: Multipolarity and the Global 'Constitutional' Frame-
work, in EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, at 1, 3 (ESIL Conference Paper Ser.
No. 1, 2018).
106. Charles Donohue argues that traces of Comparative Law can actually be found
in the ancient world. Charles Donohue, Comparative Law Before the Code Napolton, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAw, supra note 103, at 4.
107. Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann, Preface to THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF COMPARATIVE LAw, at vii (Reimann & Zimmermann eds., 2d ed. 2019).
108. Historically, Comparative Law analyzed only civil and common law, largely
because Western countries carried out most international business transactions, and it
was in their commercial interest to control the rules of the game. See 48 Guy I. Seidman,
The New Comparative Civil Procedure, in THE DYNAMISM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-GLOBAL
TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 19 (Colin B. Picker & Guy I. Seidman eds., 2016).
109. As recently as 1985, Rene David and John E.C. Brierley compared the Romano-
Germanic family, Socialist laws, the common law, and "other conceptions of law and the
social order," including Sharia law, India, laws of the far East, and the laws of Africa and
Malagasy. RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY
vii-xii (3d ed. 1985). In 1994, Mary Ann Glendon, Michael Wallace Gordon, and Chris-
topher Osakwe compared various aspects of the civil code and common law traditions.
See generally MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS (2d ed. 1994).
H. Patrick Glenn notably distanced himself from these titles and categories. His book
covers, in balanced fashion, the chthonic, Talmudic, civil, Islamic, common law, Hindu,
and Asian legal traditions, and argues persuasively in favor of preservation of, and
respect for, each system. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINA-
BLE DIVERSITY IN LAw (Oxford Univ. Press 5th ed. 2014).
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negatively, believing they are less sophisticated and therefore less able to
provide useful contributions. He states:
Sometimes what may be going on in the background is a result of a confla-
tion of a distaste for the other state's culture or politics with the parent
state's approaches and hence an unwillingness to even consider the potential
benefits of comparative analyses involving the legal system of those
states.110
Werner Menski tends to agree, stating: "Global legal debates on
human rights and religious law circle uncomfortably around the often
unspoken but systematic denial that anything useful could be learnt from
non-Western socio-legal traditions."1 11
But this reductive perspective may be on its way out. Interest in non-
Western legal systems has increased in recent years. Funders, aid organiza-
tions, and academics are now more willing to examine whether non-West-
ern systems can make useful contributions during legal reform efforts."i 2
Non-Western systems may be of particular use in conflict contexts, where
state-sponsored legal mechanisms may have completely disappeared or
been discredited.' 1 3
VI. Toward a Comparative Problem-Solving Model During Post-
Conflict Reconstruction Processes
As a strategy for avoiding cut-and-paste methodologies during legiti-
mate, Rule of Law reform processes,114 this Article proposes a "toolkit
approach." The approach begins with conflict assessment, then disaggre-
gates the preexisting legal system that may have contributed to the conflict,
and ends with a comparative examination of other systems whose compo-
nent parts might contribute to peace-building.
110. 48 Colin B. Picker, Comparative Law as an Engine of Change for Civil Procedure, in
THE DYNAMISM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-GLOBAL TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 108,
at 45, 54.
111. MENSKI, supra note 57, at 30. Menski goes on to say that if scholars took the time
and made the effort to study Asian and African perspectives "from inside," so-called
universal, eurocentric assumptions about what law is would become "impossible to
maintain." Id. at 32.
112. See, e.g., JAN STROMSEM, USAID, AFRICA REGIONAL RULE OF LAW STATUS REvIEw 58
(2009) ("It is becoming increasingly understood that for sustainability, donor programs
must take into account customary and religious systems prevalent in all countries of the
region. Albeit still on a limited basis, the international community is beginning to
reconsider its position with respect to traditional and customary systems.").
113. See Kirsti Samuels, Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Countries: Operational Ini-
tiatives and Lessons Learnt, in SoCIAL DEVELOPMENT PAPERS 1, 18 (World Bank, Conflict
Prevention & Reconstruction Ser. No. 37, 2006).
114. Whether reading for background knowledge or in search of a blueprint, Noah
Feldman remembers that, while flying to Baghdad in his capacity as Senior Constitu-
tional Adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority, "most of his fellow advisers were
reading books on the reconstruction of Germany and Japan in the wake of the Second
World War." JEFF BRIDOUX, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND POSTwAR RECONSTRUCTION:
COMPARING JAPAN AND IRAQ 132 (2011).
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A. Conflict Mapping
Conflict mapping is a relatively new field that crosses boundaries
between political science, where it was traditionally situated, and law.
Conflict mapping differs from a needs assessment or baseline study; it
involves "separating [and analyzing] the constituent parts of a conflict,
such as the historical background, parties, issues involved, and [the] con-
text" in which the conflict emerged.' 15 During post-conflict, legal system
reform, mapping the local system is recommended as part of the conflict
analysis.116 Conflict mapping requires an interdisciplinary team-includ-
ing anthropologists, political scientists, and conflict management or orga-
nizational specialists-to work alongside national experts, especially those
who were excluded from former power structures, to complement a cadre
of judges, prosecutors, and other legal system actors." 7
The mapping process, which examines links between the preexisting
legal system and the root causes of conflict, should yield a list of legal
issues to be addressed and set the stage for a comparative analysis of the
contributions other legal systems could make to resolve those issues.18 A
number of organizations involved in legal reform, including the European
Commission119 and the Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias
Penales de Guatemala (Institute for the Comparative Study of Criminal Law
in Guatemala), advocate for problem-solving approaches that initiate legal
reform by first identifying the specific problems to be addressed.120
115. Wendy S. Betts & Gregory Gisvold, Conflict Mapping: Innovation in International
Responses in Post-Conflict Societies, HUM. RTs. BRIEF, Spring 2003, at 24, 25. Conflict
mapping was carried out in Timor-Leste following the 2006-2007 violence that broke
out among various ethnic and community groups, partly as a result of complex and
contradictory land title laws. See Scambary, supra note 55, at 276-78.
116. See generally VIENNE O'CONNOR, MAPPING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND LEGAL FRAmE-
wORK IN A CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRY (2015). Wilita D. Sanguma argues that the inter-
national community's "inability to understand ... the different factors ... fueling the
overall conflict in Congo" was responsible for its poor peacebuilding performance.
Wilita D. Sanguma, Re-evaluating Peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A
Case Study in Dongo 29 (Nov. 2012) (unpublished MIS thesis, University of San Fran-
cisco) (on file with the University of San Francisco's Digital Repository of Master's
Theses).
117. USAID's approach to a conflict-oriented Rule of Law assessment marries strate-
gies of a general Rule of Law country analysis, which determines the status of five essen-
tial elements of a well-functioning justice system-order and security, legitimacy,
fairness, checks and balances, and effective application-with a conflict assessment. See
GAn. LECCE ET AL., USAID, GUIDE TO RULE OF LAw COUNTRY ANALYSIs: THE RULE OF LAw
STRATEGIc FRAMEwoRK 1-2, 20 (2008).
118. A type of problem-solving comparative methodology is proposed by Kent Roach,
who examines the rise in wrongful convictions in Anglo-American legal systems, which
has shaken public confidence in adversarial criminal justice systems. He argues that
introducing reforms based on inquisitorial models could offer solutions to these
problems. See Kent Roach, Wrongful Convictions: Adversarial and Inquisitorial Themes,
35 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 387, 424 (2010).
119. See Joint Staff Working Document, supra note 7, at 13.
120. See Graeme Thompson, Putting Guatemala's Justice System on Trial, INT'L DEv.
RsCH. CTR. (Dec. 3, 2004), https://www.idrc.ca/en/article/putting-guatemalas-justice-
system-trial [https://perma.cc/LJ2L-YAM6].
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Since they begin by addressing root issues and then tailor recommen-
dations to specific contexts, problem-solving models during post-conflict
reconstruction are consistent with the recognition that one-size-fits-all mod-
els, sometimes referred to as "cut-and-paste" models that encourage advis-
ers to fall back on their familiarity with their own legal systems, do not
work. The Secretary General's report on The Rule of Law and Transitional
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies advocates for the abandonment
of "cut-and-paste" models,12 1 and instead recommends using national
assessments, national participation, and reference to national needs and
aspirations.12 2 In addition to ensuring local legitimacy, a problem-solving
model has the benefit of focusing on the specific goals of local communi-
ties and the specific root causes of conflict.12 3 Individualized problem-
solving also allows power structures that supported conflict to be taken
into consideration.124
B. The Comparative Law Methodology
The proposed Comparative Law approach is designed to create a tool-
kit for legal system advisers, expanding the range of alternatives available
for consideration during post-conflict system reform. Although the prac-
tice of using Comparative Law methodologies to problem-solve is not long-
standing, it has recently gained acceptance.12 5 However, the practice
requires working knowledge of the spectrum of legal traditions.
In the context of system reform, some of the component parts of legal
systems worth examining for their specific relationship to conflict include
the topics discussed in the following sections.
121. See generally The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict
Societies, supra note 101.
122. Rachel Kleinfeld offers a similar perspective. She advocates for a turn away from
institution-based approaches during Rule of Law reform, which often lead to "institu-
tion-modeling." KLEINFELD, supra note 5, at 11. Kleinfeld explains that "[i]n too many
countries, reformers approach program creation by looking at each legal institution or
law, comparing it to its Western counterpart, and then trying to create 'improvements'
until [the two] match." Id. This strategy, she argues, ignores "political and cultural pres-
sures that deform institutions." Id.
123. See id. at 14.
124. See id. at 33; LYDAY & STOMsEM, supra note 75, at 13.
125. See Scott Dodson, The Challenge of Comparative Civil Procedure, 60 ALA. L. REV.
133, 138 (2008). Justice Stephen Breyer advocates for a comparative approach, arguing
that opposition in the U.S. to considering the way judges in other countries solve similar
problems is largely a political issue taken up by elected officials who believe that U.S.
laws should not be based on laws of foreign institutions.
[I]f someone with a job roughly like my own, facing a legal problem roughly like
the one confronting me, interpreting a document that resembles the one I look
to, has written a legal opinion about a similar matter, why not read what the
judge has said? I might learn from it, whether or not I end up agreeing with it.
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C. Triers of Fact' 2 6
A variety of options exist for making fact determinations, including
the use of lay jurors,12 7 mixed panels of lay jurors and professional
judges,128 and judges sitting either individually or in panels.12 9 In West
Africa, lay judges make findings of fact.130 In some systems, community
members with specific expertise may decide cases in conjunction with one
or more judges.131 The most effective model will depend on the nature of
the problem identified. For example, the use of lay juries-as opposed to
judges-as triers of fact may be advisable when judicial corruption is an
issue.132 But juries may not be advisable when the conflict was a result of
ethnic, racial, or religious tensions because jury members could use ver-
dicts as a form of "victors' justice."13 3 Additionally, the use of lay jurors
has been criticized when the issues to be decided are complex and outside
the scope of an individual's everyday knowledge.134
BREYER, supra note 103, at 240.
126. For a comprehensive comparative analysis of various models of triers of fact, see
generally Valerie P. Hans, Jury Systems Around the World, 4 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. Sci. 275
(2008).
127. The use of lay jurors is, of course, a hallmark of common law systems. However,
in recent years, lay juries have been introduced in historically inquisitorial systems,
including those of Argentina, Japan, and Italy. See generally Meryll Dean, Legal Trans-
plants and Jury Trial in Japan, 31 LEGAL STUD. 570 (2011); Pizzi & Montagna, supra note
59; Caitlyn Scherr, Chasing Democracy: The Development and Acceptance of Jury Trials in
Argentina, 47 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 316 (2016).
128. This is the practice in Germany. See Thomas Weigend, Germany, in CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: A WORLDwIDE STUDY, supra note 62, at 243, 263. In China, "cases are heard
by ... a 'collegial panel' of three jurists.... [T]wo members of the panel are professional
judges," and the third is a "people's assessor." Ira Belkin, China, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
A WORLDwIDE STUDY, supra note 62, at 91, 103; see also Criminal Procedure Law of the
People's Republic of China, CONG.-EXEC. COMM'N ON CHINA (2012), https://
www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/criminal-procedure-law-of-the-peoples-repub-
lic-of-china [https://perma.cc/CA9C-LMFD].
129. This is the traditional civil code model; one example is the Netherlands. See Art.
268 para. 1 Sv (Neth.); see also Pizzi, supra note 103, at 94. In France, unpaid members
of local business communities, who are elected by their peers, try commercial cases.
ANDREW WEsT ET AL., THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 78 (2d ed. 1998). A college of employers
and a college of employees elect judges in French labor courts, or Conseil de
Prud'hommes. Id. at 80.
130. Obi N.I. Ebbe, The Unique and Comparative Features of the Criminal Justice Sys-
tems, International Law, and the United Nations Criminal Courts: A Synthesis, in COMPARA-
T[VE AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 275, 278 (Obi N.I. Ebbe ed., 3d ed.
2013).
131. This is the case in Croatia, for example, where lay judges sit with professional
judges in juvenile cases. The lay judges are "teachers, professors, or other persons with
relevant experience in juvenile education." Hans, supra note 126, at 279. Similarly, in
Thailand's three specialized courts, "laypersons with expertise in the court's domain
decide cases together with professional judges." Id. at 280.
132. See id. at 276.
133. However, as Michael Hartmann points out, using judges to try cases in these
post-conflict climates can also lead to biased results. See HARTMANN, supra note 44, at 4.
134. In England and Wales, for example, the Roskill Committee recommended, in
1986, that complex fraud cases should not be tried by lay juries. See David J. Feldman,
England and Wales, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDwIDE STUDY, supra note 62, at 149,
172-73.
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D. Control of Investigations in Criminal Cases
Oversight of investigations in criminal cases can generally be carried
out by an Investigating Judge or prosecutor. In contexts where there is an
imbalance of power between the prosecution and defense, an Investigating
Judge charged with investigating both inculpatory and exculpatory evi-
dence can help to protect the rights of the accused.135 This model can also
be useful if there are not enough defense attorneys available, which may be
the case in post-conflict settings. Supporters of the role of the Investigating
Judge also argue that it eliminates the atmosphere of gamesmanship during
trial.136 On the other hand, critics believe that judges charged with investi-
gating the truth of events may suffer from confirmation bias, which
reduces their incentive to investigate alternate theories of the case.13 7
However, the same critique can be made of prosecutors.138
E. Role of Police
Inquisitorial systems can benefit from the service of Judicial Police
who work under the supervision of the judiciary during the secret investi-
gation phase.139 This is the case in Italy, where certain police officers are
under the control of the Investigating Judge during the investigation of
cases related to suspected mafia activity.14 0
In adversarial systems, law enforcement officials' interests are in closer
alignment with the prosecution, potentially creating an imbalance of arms
since the defense does not have access to a similar body of investigators.
F. Role of Defense Lawyers
In adversarial systems, defense lawyers enjoy more robust opportuni-
ties to be heard and to protect the interests of their clients than in inquisito-
rial systems.141 Although this may be beneficial in systems with enough
defense lawyers, in systems where their numbers are fewer, the absence of
defense counsel during critical stages of the case can be problematic.
Thus, care should be taken not to delegate the protection of defense rights
to non-existent lawyers. In these situations, a fairer system might delegate
135. This is the case in France, where the Investigating Judge is charged with finding
"the objective truth" instead of focusing on "the guilt of a particular suspect." CATHERINE
ELLIOTT & CATHERINE VERNON, FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 162 (2000).
136. See Pizzi, supra note 103, at 126-28; Roach, supra note 118, at 390.
137. See Robert P. Mosteller, Failures of the American Adversarial System to Protect the
Innocent and Conceptual Advantages in the Inquisitorial Design for Investigative Fairness,
36 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 319, 326-27 n.25 (2011).
138. See Roach, supra note 118, at 401.
139. See WEST ET AL., supra note 129, at 258.
140. See ELLIOTT & VERNON, supra note 135, at 164.
141. In France, an accused's right to meet with defense counsel during detention is
much more strictly curtailed than in common law systems. For instance, the initial
meeting may not last more than thirty minutes during the first twenty-four hours of
detention. If the detention period is extended, the length of sequential meetings with
counsel depends on the nature of the charges under investigation. See CODE DE PROC-
DURE PENALE [C. PR. PEN.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] arts. 63-64 (Fr.).
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those responsibilities to an Investigating Judge.142
In systems in which defense lawyers do play important roles, it is
important that they are trained and empowered equally alongside other
actors in the judicial system. It is not uncommon in post-conflict settings
for judges and prosecutors to be trained first with defense lawyers only
included later when it becomes clear that cases cannot proceed in their
absence.143
G. Secrecy of the Investigation Phase
During traditional, inquisitorial proceedings, investigation of criminal
cases is carried out by an Investigating Judge working in a confidential
setting away from public view. 14 Violations of the duty of confidentiality
may carry criminal, civil, and disciplinary sanctions.145 Advocates of this
system credit its protection of the reputation of accused persons who
should benefit from the pretrial presumption of innocence and to the abil-
ity of judges to fully investigate a case without losing witnesses or risking
the destruction of evidence.14 6
However, secrecy in investigation phases has been linked to financial
and political corruption since it is easier to buy results when the public
and media have no access to judicial processes.14 7 Opportunities for "tele-
phone justice"-when politicians order judges to decide cases in certain
ways-may also increase. This is a potential issue in post-conflict settings
when domestic courts try serious crimes that arose during the conflict and
may involve warring factions. Secret investigations may allow politically
inclined judges to dismiss charges filed against persons or groups with
whom they sympathize.
H. Judicial Control of Expert Witnesses
Control over expert witnesses has been the subject of vigorous debate
142. For that reason, in these situations, an individual's direct access to the courts is
especially important. See Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Direct Access to the African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights by Individuals and Non Governmental Organisations: An Over-
view of the Emerging Jurisprudence of the African Court 2008-2012, 2 INT'L HUM. RTs. L.
REv. 17, 20 (2013). Direct access of individuals to the European Court of Human Rights
is permitted under Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights. European
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 95, at art. 34.
143. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, AFGHANISTAN: RE-ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW 30-32
(2003).
144. See ELLIOTr & VERNON, supra note 135, at 142-43.
145. See, e.g., CODE DE PROCEDURE P@NALE [C. PR. PEN.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] art.
11 (Fr.); CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 226 (Fr.); see also ELLIOTr & VERNON,
supra note 135, at 143.
146. See Heather Horn, The French Are Unimpressed by American Justice, ATmmTC
Uune 13, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/06/dsk-trial-
leaves-french-unimpressed-american-justice/351649 [https://perma.cc/B4ZG-8YKJ].
147. The 1997 Truche Report, issued by the Commission de reflexion sur la Justice in
France, recommended reducing the powers of the Investigating Judge and increasing
transparency in the criminal justice system. The Commission was convened following
allegations that politicians benefitted from secrecy during criminal investigations. See
ELLIOTr & VERNON, supra note 135, at 141-42.
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in recent years.14 8 In adversarial systems, experts may be expected to ally
themselves with one side and not testify for the other.149 Further, when
the accused is indigent, it is unlikely she will have the same access to
expert testimony from which the prosecution benefits.150
In France, neutrality of experts is ensured by a system that assigns
responsibility for obtaining expert witnesses to judges. Each jurisdiction
maintains a list of experts organized according to areas of expertise, and
the experts are hired by the judge investigating a case.151 If the court
desires a second opinion, or if either party requests one, the court has
authority to engage additional experts.'5 2
In Ontario, Canada, the integrity of unbiased expert opinions is main-
tained by Court Rule 53,153 which requires that expert witnesses provide
the name of the party that has hired them and sign an affidavit acknowl-
edging their duty to provide evidence that is fair, objective, and non-
partisan.
I. Guilty Pleas and Plea Bargains
The impact of guilty pleas is an issue that has "long divided civil and
common law lawyers."1 54 In inquisitorial systems, admissions of guilt are
taken into consideration along with other evidence in the search for truth;
that is, a "full investigation and trial automatically take place, regardless of
whether the accused has confessed."15 5 Guilty pleas may be prohibited
altogether in serious cases because criminal proceedings "in these systems
prioritize accurate determination of the truth over the accused's autonomy"
in the direction of the case.156
148. See generally, e.g., Arthur Daemmrich, The Evidence Does Not Speak for Itself:
Expert Witnesses and the Organization of DNA-Typing Companies, 28 Soc. STUD. Sci. 741
(1998).
149. See Mark Hansen, CSI Breakdown, AM. BAR Ass'N J. (Nov. 1, 2010, 9:50 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/csibreakdown [https://perma.cc/
W2BT-6F38].
150. See Roach, supra note 118, at 405-06 (citing a study of forty cases in the U.S. "in
which DNA analysis revealed eyewitness identifications to be mistaken," and in none of
those cases had a defense expert in eyewitness identification been called).
151. For a list of experts available to judges of the Cour de Cassation, see Experts
Judiciaires, COUR DE CASsATION (2020), https://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_
publicationsdocumentation_2/experts-judiciaires_8700.html [https://perma.cc/
63MD-3KXQ].
152. See WEST ET AL., supra note 129, at 297.
153. See Kosta Kalogiros & Shanique M. Lake, To Comply or Not to Comply? When
Experts Fall Outside the Scope of Rule 53.03, McCARTHY (May 4, 2015), https://
www.mccarthy.ca/en/insights/blogs/canadian-appeals-monitor/comply-or-not-comply-
when-experts-fall-outside-scope-rule-5303 [https://perma.cc/DV2T-CU6P]; Form 53:
Acknowledgment of Expert's Duty, ONT. CT. FORMs (2007), http://ontari-
ocourtforms.on.ca/static/media/uploads/courtforms/civil/53/rcp-53-e.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3TDY-PCAY].
154. Silvia A. FernAndez de Gurmendi, International Criminal Law Procedures: The
Process of Negotiations, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME
STATUTE 217, 223 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
155. ELuIOTr & VERNON, supra note 135, at 172.
156. Roach, supra note 118, at 397-98; see also Montana, supra note 59, at 107.
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In adversarial systems, a confession or guilty plea may be dispositive
of the case; and, in some jurisdictions, confessions need not be corrobo-
rated.15 7 As a result, there may be cases in which guilty pleas are unrelated
to the actual guilt of the accused.158
In post-conflict settings, where there are inadequate numbers of
defense lawyers, dangers associated with guilty pleas increase when
accused persons are unadvised about burdens of proof, their legal rights,
and the consequences of a guilty plea. Guilty pleas and plea bargains may
therefore be unwise in these contexts.159
J. Admissibility of Evidence
Common law systems tend to include elaborate rules of evidence that
prohibit hearsay and other forms of indirect evidence.160 Additionally, evi-
dence may be excluded to serve policy preferences, such as discouraging
police malfeasance and violations of rights or rules of search and
seizure.161 This can occur even when the excluded evidence is directly
relevant to the truth.' 6 2
When lay juries are not used, justifications for excluding evidence
may decrease.16 3 This is the approach of traditional inquisitorial systems,
in which all evidence is admitted and judges decide whether it is proba-
tive.164 In post-conflict settings in which resources are scarce and com-
mon law chain of custody requirements are difficult to meet, the
inquisitorial practice of introducing all evidence that may be relative to the
truth of the case may be less expensive and cumbersome than common law
procedures.
157. See Roach, supra note 118, at 396.
158. See, e.g., Walter Pavlo, Are Innocent People Pleading Guilty? A New Report Says Yes,
FORBES (July 31, 2018, 8:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2018/07/
31/are-innocent-people-pleading-guilty-a-new-report-says-yes/#
68 79b 3 2 51937 [https://
perma.cc/5UFS-SP5U]; Jeffrey D. Stein, How to Make an Innocent Client Plead Guilty,
WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2018, 8:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-
innocent-people-plead-guilty/2018/01/ 2/e05d262c-b805-1 le7-a908-a3470754bbb9_
story.html?noredirect&utm_term=.2c0241ca7350 [https://perma.cc/RC62-KJ6F}. Ken
Roach argues that "the adversarial system's willingness to accept a guilty plea from a
person who may be innocent is an inherent limitation of an adversary system that is
based on parties' autonomy in resolving disputes in a manner [that is] in accordance
with their interests." Roach, supra note 118, at 392.
159. For various ways that plea bargains have been introduced and adapted in civil
code systems, see Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The
Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45
HARv. INT'L LJ. 1, 39, 46 (2004).
160. See MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAw ADRIr 13 (Yale Univ. Press 1997).
161. See Monrad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 255, 255 (1961).
162. See DAMASKA, supra note 160, at 13.
163. Id. at 2 (citing to James Thayer, who claimed that the common law's rules of
evidence are primarily "the child of the jury system").
164. See WEST ET AL., supra note 129, at 146.
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K. Joint Civil and Criminal Trials
The inquisitorial practice of joining civil cases to criminal proceed-
ings1 6 5 and allowing judges to determine criminal guilt or innocence while
also evaluating potential civil damages-and, if necessary, appropriate
criminal punishment-can save costs and ensure legal representation in
post-conflict contexts in which resources are limited and lawyers are
scarce.
Joining civil and criminal cases can also avoid the risk of inconsistent
verdicts,16 6 which can have the consequence of undermining public confi-
dence in judicial systems immediately following conflict, a time when
embedding the Rule of Law is especially critical. Burdens of proof, which
can differ in civil and criminal cases in common law systems, must be
considered if joint trials are implemented.
L. Judicial Oversight of Civil Cases
Judicial oversight during civil litigation is much greater in inquisitorial
systems than in adversarial systems, in which cases are largely controlled
by lawyers.16 7 In France, for example, cases that are not ready on the day
of trial are referred to a judge who then assumes an active role preparing
the case. This judge, known as the juge de la mise en etat, possesses a
number of powers necessary to prepare the case for trial when parties have
not managed to do so themselves.168
In post-conflict settings in which resources are limited, judicial control
over civil proceedings can save time and resources and eliminate games-
manship. However, in situations in which the judiciary is corrupt, judicial
control may further decrease public confidence in the Rule of Law.
165. This practice is true in most civil code systems, including in Italy. See Pizzi &
Montagna, supra note 59, at 433 n.7 ("Every criminal offense in Italy also constitutes a
civil offense and, as such, there is a right to compensation for the injury to the person
injured by the crime."). For example, Italy's Code of Criminal Procedure states that "the
civil action to claim compensation or reparation provided for by Codice Penale art. 185
can be brought as part of the criminal trial by the person injured by the crime or by his/
her general successors against the defendant or the person having a civil responsibility."
Id. (quoting Codice di procedura penale [C.p.p.] art. 74 (It.)).
166. Allegedly, inconsistent criminal and civil verdicts in the OJ. Simpson case gener-
ated global criticism of the U.S. common law system. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Jury
Decides Simpson Must Pay $25 Million in Punitive Award, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 1997),
https://www.nytimes.com/ 1997/02/1 l/us/jury-decides-simpson-must-pay-25-million-
in-punitive-award.html [https://perma.cc/Y7QB-TSD9].
167. See Scott Dodson & James M. Klebba, Global Civil Procedure Trends in the Twenty-
First Century, 34 B.C. INT'L & COMPAR. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (2011). Common law judges'
overall lack of control over court proceedings has been criticized by academics and
others. See, e.g., James R. Maxeiner, What America Can Learn from Germany's Justice
System, ATLANTIC (June 7, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/
06/what-america-can-learn-from-germanys-justice-system/258208 [https://perma.cc/
92KE-XRRH].
168. ELLIOTr & VERNON, supra note 135, at 128. Judges exercise similar control over
civil proceedings in Germany. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil
Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 830-41 (1985).
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M. Community-Based Institutions
In rural areas untouched by internationally-sponsored, legal reform
efforts, local centers for dispute resolution have been utilized.16 9 These
centers, which generally reflect goals of customary law170 and are inspired
by holistic concepts of justice, reinforce the idea that "the ultimate goal of
the legal process is not retribution and punishment for crimes and trans-
gressions of the social order, but rather rehabilitation and community heal-
ing." 17 1 They have been successfully implemented in Colombia,172 where
Casas de Justicia, characterized as interinstitutional units that provide
information, orientation, referral, and services for the resolution of con-
flict, meld formal and informal mechanisms that include various ethnic
groups' manifestations of justice.173
This model is potentially useful in post-conflict settings in which com-
munities have been riven by conflict and are in need of reconciliation, and
where national laws and state-sponsored justice systems have lost
credibility.1 74
N. Mediation and Arbitration
In a number of legal systems, mediation is becoming increasingly pop-
ular as an alternative to litigation, which can be expensive and pro-
tracted.175 "In some jurisdictions, such as Germany, India, Bermuda,
Hong Kong and China, a private, mediated settlement can be converted
169. Alternatives to state-sponsored models can also be viable in non-rural contexts.
These models find support among comparatists who argue for the Western models,
while also arguing for the expansion of models. See Seidman, supra note 108, at 20, 43.
170. See Access to Justice Brief, supra note 55, at 16. For example, in rural areas of
Timor-Leste,
[most cases] are resolved through the traditional justice system; if a case cannot
be resolved there, it is referred to formal court. Most people prefer to avoid
formal courts since its processes are unfamiliar and are conducted in Portu-
guese or Tetun, which few people speak. Victims in particular tend to prefer
traditional justice mechanisms since resolution of disputes results in concrete
reparations to victims in the form of something useful, such as cattle.
Id. at 13. "However, reparations awarded by traditional leaders do not always comply
with requirements of fairness and equality." Id. at n.18. Reparations for injury to a
female, for example, may be given to her family and not directly to her. Id.
171. Juan Carlos Botero, The Three Faces of Justice: Legal Traditions, Legal Trans-
plants, and Customary Justice in a Multicultural World 225 (2013) (unpublished S.J.D.
thesis, Georgetown University Law Center) (on file with the Georgetown University Digi-
tial Repository).
172. See CECILIA BRADY, USAID, BUILDING ALLIANCEs SERIES: DEMOCRACY 10-11 (2009).
173. See LIMPAL COLOMBIA, PARTICIPANDO . . . ANDO A LA SOMBRA DE LA RESOLUCION
1325, at 14, 20-21 (2012); see also Botero, supra note 171, at 254 (arguing that in sec-
ond- and third-world countries, formal and customary systems of dispute resolution "are
increasingly misaligned with the changing reality of a globalized yet multicultural
world,"and that a third model, based on notions of customary justice, is needed).
174. See Samuels, supra note 113, at 18.
175. In some jurisdictions of the United States, presumptive alternative dispute reso-
lution is on the rise as a strategy to eliminate case backlogs and enhance the quality of
justice. See, e.g., Claudia Lanzetta, Be Prepared: 'Presumptive ADR' Is Coming, N.Y. L.J.
(Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/08/02/be-prepared-
presumptive-adr-is-coming [https://perma.cc/DU6B-JWCE].
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into an arbitral award, thereby enjoying the same enforceability as a court
judgment."176 Principles of private arbitration that are enforceable in
national courts are consistent with practices of religious tribunals used in
some communities.17 7
0. Mobile Courts
Although technically not an aspect of a specific legal system, mobile
courts have proven useful in rural areas where communities are recovering
from conflict and are disillusioned with the state court system. In Timor-
Leste, for example, victims, witnesses, and suspects were brought from dif-
ferent regions of the country to participate in hearings held in police sta-
tions and government offices.17 8 In Liberia, judges, prosecutors, and
defense advocates were brought to detention facilities to try criminal cases,
thereby avoiding logistical difficulties in transporting detainees to other
facilities.179
Mobile courts have proven useful in these circumstances to demon-
strate to communities that courts are functioning and to address transpor-
tation and infrastructure deficiencies while educating the public on
judicial procedures.
VII. Skepticism Towards Hybridity
The tinderbox and toolkit dichotomy suggested in this Article-which
proposes that legal systems be disaggregated, and their component parts
analyzed for possible contributions to creating and resolving conflict-
presents several potential risks. One of these risks is that the selected
advisers will fail to implement the strategy because they lack adequate
training in other legal systems.18 0 Among academics, resistance might
176. Steven Austermiller, Cambodian Alternative Dispute Resolution, in INTRODUCTION
TO CAMBODIAN LAw 181, 190 (Hor Peng et al. eds., 2012) (citations omitted); see also
Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance Act, No. 26 of 1996, INDIA CODE (1996), arts.
73-74; ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE}, § 1053 (Ger.);
Zhonghus Renmin G6nghtgu6 Zh6ngcai Fa ('IAl {fllt$M) [Arbitration Law
of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995) 1995 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S
CONG. GAZ. 717, art. 51 (China); Arbitration Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 341, 5, § 2C
(H.K.).
177. For example, judgments rendered by Beth Din courts are enforceable in secular
courts pursuant to binding arbitration agreements signed by parties. In this way, parties
are able to settle disputes according to religious law. Din Torah (Arbitration) Services,
BETH DIN AM., https://bethdin.org/dintorah [https://perma.cc/3H98-K7FF] (last visited
Aug. 13, 2019).
178. See Access to Justice Brief, supra note 55, at 10.
179. See Magistrate Sitting Program in Liberia, JUDICIARY, http://judiciary.gov.lr/mag-
istrate-sitting-program [https://perma.cc/3Y6R-KMFP] (last visited Aug. 13, 2019).
180. Menski refers to conversations with well-educated, practicing lawyers, who con-
firmed that their greatest knowledge gap is a lack of "insight into legal systems other
than the ones in which they are" expected to practice. MENsI, supra note 57, at 45. The
lack of training in legal systems other than their own among so-called legal experts
posed a challenge during negotiations of the Rome Statute. See Fernindez de
Gurmendi, supra note 154, at 220.
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arise due to historical biases against hybrid legal systems, which result
when aspects of different legal system are intermixed.18' For those mind-
ful of post-colonial legacies, hybridity is often negatively associated with
issues of injustice and power.18 2
However, much of the criticism of hybrid systems is misplaced and
based on conflations in terminology.183 Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Rich-
mond review the recent interest in hybridity during peacebuilding
processes in the context of hybrid political orders.184 While their critique
relates to a different context, their view on hybridity bears a close look in
the context of post-conflict legal systems:
In terms of conceptual discussion, it is worth noting how hybridity frees us
from the rigidities of standard categories and binaries often deployed to
explain peacebuilding and statebuilding mainly as exercises of top-down
power and leadership. It allows us to build holistic accounts of conflicts and
escape orthodox conflict analysis templates that seem unaware of inconsis-
tency, margins, dissent, gender and all things that make the human experi-
ence variegated and contingent. It further allows us to see more clearly the
multiple sources of power and agency that constrain and enable. Funda-
mentally, the concept of hybridity, if used as a post-colonial, post-territorial
and post-biological construct, liberates us from the dominant policy script
181. In one case, the hybrid system introduced by UNTAET in Timor-Leste was
unartfully and perhaps unfairly termed a "mishmash." Suzannah Linton, Rising from the
Ashes: The Creation of a Viable Criminal Justice System in East Timor, 25 MELB. U.L. REV.
122, 174 (2001). A radio commentator even stated, in the context of Timor-Leste's tran-
sition to independence and the necessity for a new legal order, "[p]ossible ingredients
for the recipe come from Portuguese law, Indonesian law, local customary law and
UNTAET's own regulations which incorporate human rights obligations. None of the
ingredients alone offers the perfect recipe-so we examine the legal 'stir-fry' which is
being painstakingly concocted." Jennifer Feller, Take Four Legal Systems and Stir!, LAw
REP. (July 11, 2000), https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/lawreport/take-
four-legal-systems-and-stir/3469360#transcript [https://perma.cc/6FGS-Z4ZT].
182. Jenny H. Peterson, A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity: Accounting for Notions of
Power, Politics and Progress in Analyses of Aid-Driven Interfaces, 7 J. PEACEBUILDING & DEV.
9, 14 (2012) ("A second and perhaps more problematic critique of hybridity relates to
the absence or downplaying of issues of injustice and power.").
183. Julian Graef, for example, analyzes hybridity in peacebuilding practices in the
context of agency and power redistributions by looking to post-liberal peace and conflict
studies. See JULIAN GRAEF, PRACTICING PosT-LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING: LEGAL EMPOWERMENT
AND EMERGENT HYBRIDITY IN LIBEIuA 1-5 (2015). Gearoid Millar states that hybridity has
become a popular term of art in "recent peacebuilding scholarship to describe .. .
hybrid peacekeeping missions, hybrid criminal tribunals, hybrid governance, and the
hybrid peace." Gearoid Millar, Disaggregating Hybridity: Why Hybrid Institutions Do Not
Produce Predictable Experiences of Peace, 51 J. PEACE RsCH. 501, 501 (2014). However, he
argues that the concept of hybridity has been "under-theorized and variably applied,"
and that actors who believe they "can plan and administer hybridity to foster predictable
social experiences in complex post-conflict states" are mistaken. Id. Interestingly, Mil-
lar also states that "the desire to sustain the relevance of academic theory and interna-
tional practice to contemporary conflict . . . drive[s] theorists of hybridity towards
prescriptive, as opposed to purely descripti[ve], approaches." Id. at 504.
184. See Roger Mac Ginty & Oliver Richmond, The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid
Political Orders: A Reappraisal of the Hybrid Turn in Peacebuilding, 23 INT'L PEACEKEEPING
219, 219 (2016) (criticizing "the ability of international actors to manufacture with pre-
cision hybrid political orders, and argu[ing] that the shallow instrumentalization of
hybridity is based on a misunderstanding of the concept.").
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of goodies and baddies, states and non-states and West and non-West. The
world we inhabit is much more complex that [sic] the binary-world
inscribed in many peacebuilding and statebuilding policies and so it
demands agile conceptual and analytical vehicles. Hybrid contexts are not
necessarily part of a transition from one condition (possibly traditionalism)
to another (possibly modernity). Instead, they deserve to be viewed in their
own right. However, they also raise vast structural issues of historical and
distributive inequality, and the dismantling and replacing of long-standing
power structures-social, cultural, political and economic hierarchies-
which need to be responded to in long-term processes if peace is to be posi-
tive and hybrid simultaneously. 185
VIII. Hybridity in Legal Systems
In the context of law and legal systems, the concept of hybridity
should be less controversial than in other disciplines. Some scholars
believe that no legal system has been truly pure since the Middle Ages.186
More conservatively, data from the University of Ottawa indicates that
today the majority of the world's people-68% of the global population-
live in mixed legal systems.187 A review of literature in the fields of Com-
parative Criminal Procedure and Comparative Civil Procedure reveals the
wide variety of system models in place around the world.1 8 8
Even within Western systems, comparatists tend to agree that distinc-
tions between civil code and common law systems may no longer be
valid.1 89 Guy I. Seidman outlines three ways in which the convergence
phenomenon can be explained.'90 First, in hindsight, it may be doubted
that distinct models of legal systems ever existed.191 Second, increasing
study of other legal systems led to explicit borrowing and adoption.19 2
Third, "with the rise of international and supranational [legal] regimes,
185. Id. at 229.
186. REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, ROMAN LAW, CONTEMPORARY LAW, EUROPEAN LAw: THE
CIvILIAN TRADITION TODAY 159 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001). A mixed system is distin-
guishable from a pluralist system in which elements of two or more legal systems coexist
but do not necessarily intermingle. Pluralist systems have "often taken place when a
people has lost its political sovereignty, yet has somehow preserved the right to continue
livng in accordance to its personal or private laws." Vernon Valentine Palmer, Mixed
Legal Systems, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 368, 377 (Mauro Bus-
sani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012).
187. Graph of Distribution of the World Population (%) Per Legal Systems, UNIV.
OTTAWA, http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/syst-demo/graph.php [https://perma.cc/TM4D-
Z5A5] (last visited Aug. 15, 2019). This data does not appear to disaggregate hybrid
and pluralist systems.
188. See JOHN W. HEAD, GREAT LEGAL TRADITIONS: CIvIL LAW, COMMON LAW, AND CHI-
NESE LAW IN HIsTORICAL AND OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 12 (2011). See generally CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007); THAMAN, supra
note 60; Ebbe, supra note 130.
189. See Seidman, supra note 108, at 20. Seidman states that the "two arch-models of
common and civil law are drawing closer" over time, evidencing system convergence.
Id.; see also Montana, supra note 59, at 108.
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efforts are being made to minimize the differences between legal systems in
order to harmonize national laws."19 3
IX. Hybridity in International and Domestic Courts and the Model
Codes Project
Hybrid systems are already present in international courts, including
in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (the Tri-
bunal) and the International Criminal Court.
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence (the Rules) at the Tribunal, negoti-
ated over the course of two years by a mix of civil and common law law-
yers,194 were "the first coherent body of principles governing the
prosecution" of international law.1 95 The Rules contain elements from
both adversarial and inquisitorial systems and reflect tensions between the
need to expedite trials and to protect the rights of the accused.1
9 6 Consis-
tent with civil code practices, which delegate oversight of cases to judges,
responsibility for ensuring that trials are both fair and expeditious is
assigned to Trial Chambers.197 Elements of each system include: the right
to closed hearings in the interest of victims and witnesses;1
98 the duty to
present "witness statements . . . before trial, not as evidence, but rather to
... familiarize [judges] with the case";19 9 the duty of the defense to "set[ ]
out in general terms the defen[s]e to the indictment, . . . [and] any motions,
by certain specified dates";200 and the duty of the defense to provide the
prosecution with a list of intended witnesses.
20' Rule 89 governs admissi-
bility of evidence and, consistent with inquisitorial practice, provides that a
Chamber "may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have proba-
tive value"20 2 and may receive witness testimony "orally or, where the inter-
ests of justice allow, in written form."
203 Although judges may refer to
193. Id. (alteration in original).
194. See 1 VIRGINIA MORRIs & MICHAEL P. ScHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOsLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS 180 (1995).
195. Gideon Boas, Creating Laws of Evidence for International Criminal Law: The ICTY
and the Principle of Flexibility, 12 CRIM. L.F. 41, 41 (2001).
196. See id. at 41-42; see also DAMASKA, supra note 160, at 1-2 n.l.
197. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art.
20, ' 1, May 23, 1995, 32 I.L.M. 1192 ("The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is
fair and expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules of
procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for
the protection of victims and witnesses.").
198. See Boas, supra note 195, at 44.
199. Id. at 45.
200. Id. at 46 (citations omitted). This concept is now embodied by Rule 65ter. See
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia, Rule 65ter, July 18, 2015, IT/32/Rev.50 [hereinafter Rules of Procedure and
Evidence].
201. See Boas, supra note 195, at 47.
202. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 200, at Rule 89(C).
203. Id. at Rule 89(F).
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national rules of evidence, they are not bound by them.204 Unsurprisingly,
legal scholars did not unanimously support the creation of these hybrid
rules, with some charging that the Tribunal was jurisdictionally unsound
and "a rogue court with rigged rules."205
The Rome Statute, which serves as the legal foundation of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, was negotiated between 1995 and 1998 and
includes elements of both adversarial and inquisitorial systems.206 Issues
debated during the drafting process included the impact of guilty pleas,
rights of suspects, admissibility of evidence, and mechanisms to protect
victims and witnesses.207
In response to paragraph eighty-one of the Brahimi Report,208 the
United States' Institute of Peace, the Irish Centre for Human Rights, the
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the U.N.
Office on Drugs and Crime developed the Model Codes to fill gaps in peace
operations where previous legal systems have lost credibility. The Model
Codes drew elements from all the major legal systems of the world and
were strongly influenced by Comparative Law discourses in international
tribunals as well as concrete experiences of advisers working in post-con-
flict environments.20 9 Hybrid in nature, and reflecting the recognition
that conflict introduces distinct exigencies during legal reform, the Model
Code of Criminal Procedure includes rules of evidence that permit hear-
204. See Boas, supra note 195, at 49 (quoting Trial Chamber III in Prosecutor v.
Kordia and terkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Decision on the Prosecution Application to
Admit the Tuliaa Report and Dossier into Evidence, I 12 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the For-
mer Yugoslavia July 29, 1999)).
205. Boas, supra note 195, at 48 (citations omitted); see also Vera Gowlland-Debbas,
Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility, 43 INT'L & COMPAR.
L.Q. 55, 56 (1994); Gabriel H. Oosthuizen, Playing the Devil's Advocate: The United
Nations Security Council Is Unbound by Law, 12 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 549, 549 (1999).
206. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 443, 443-44, 464 (1999). Bassiouni,
who served as Chair of the Drafting Committee, provides insight into the pitfalls of
negotiating the contents of an international treaty with experts from different legal sys-
tems. Because some of the provisions of the Rome Statute were eventually resolved polit-
ically and diplomatically, the risk of creating a legal framework without internal
coherence existed. Challenges in sensitizing members of the Drafting Group to aspects
of legal systems different from their own was addressed, in part, by adjusting normal
U.N. seating arrangements so that members would focus on the text of the draft. This
strategy also diminished the psychological implications of adhering only to nationalistic
positions. Id. at 452; see also Elisabetta Grande, Comparative Criminal Justice, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE Lw, supra note 186, at 191, 193. Grande
argues that with the advent of international criminal tribunals, including the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, comparative criminal procedure went from a theoretical disci-
pline to a practical one, which required integrative comparative searches to discover the
applicable law. Id.
207. See Fernandez de Gurmendi, supra note 154, at 223.
208. Brahimi Report, supra note 8, ¶ 81.
209. See 2 MODEL CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: MODEL CODES FOR POsT-CONFLICT
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 345 (Vivienne O'Connor & Colette Rausch eds., 2008) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]; see also U.S. INST. PEACE, https://www.usip.org/
?sitekeywords=model%20Codes [https://perma.cc/N3LQ-7PB5] (last visited Aug. 15,
2019) (search for "model codes").
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say2 10 and specify mandatory and discretionary exclusion of evidence.
211
Responsibility for investigating criminal cases is delegated to prosecutors,
as opposed to investigating judges,2 12 and prosecutors are required to
investigate exonerating as well as incriminating evidence.
2 13 Victims may
participate in criminal proceedings if judges so authorize, as opposed to
their automatic right to participate in civil code systems.214 Common law
aspects of the Model Code of Criminal Procedure include the adversarial
nature of the proceedings,21 5 the standard of proof,2 16 and the principle
requiring live testimony at trial.2 1 7 Civil code aspects include the power of
judges to compel the production of evidence during trial.2 1
8
System convergence-or, in other words, system hybridity-is also
increasing within a number of domestic legal systems. Although tradition-
ally, judicial opinions in civil code systems did not carry precedential
weight,2 19 jurisprudence has become increasingly available in civil code
systems in recent years,22 0 indicating its increasing precedential value.
221
For example, French judges have spoken openly of their reliance on judi-
cial precedent,222 and in Vietnam-a historically civil code system-the use
of precedent "was officially recognized by [the] Supreme People's Court in
2016."223 At the same time, common law systems have become increas-
210. See MODEL CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 209, at 345-46.
211. See id. at 345-58.
212. See id. at 91-92.
213. See id. at 93-94.
214. See id. at 135. The primary concern when drafters were debating this issue was
the general absence of lawyers in post-conflict settings, which often results in insuffi-
cient lawyers for accused persons. Adding the right of victims to lawyers would only
further burden legal systems struggling to recover from conflict. E-mail from Vivienne
O'Connor, Rule of Law Project Officer, Irish Centre for Human Rights (Oct. 18, 2011,
11:08 EST) (on file with author).
215. See MODEL CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 209, at 338.
216. Id. at 336.
217. See id. at 345.
218. See id. at 362.
219. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 5 (Fr.); see also ELLIOTT & VERNON,
supra note 135, at 50; Olivier Moreteau, Codes as Straight-Jackets, Safeguards, and Alibis:
The Experience of the French Civil Code, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 273, 281 (1995).
220. See, e.g., Common Portal of Case Law, NETWORK PRESIDENTS SUPREME JUD. CTS.
EUR. UNION, http://www.reseau-presidents.eu/rpcsjue/index.php [https://perma.cc/
DQR8-LRXK] (last visited Aug. 15, 2019); Legal Databases, EUR. UNIV. INST., https://
www.eui.eu/Research/Library/ResearchGuides/Law/Legal-Databases [https://perma.
cc/TJ9Z-LVCZ] (last visited Aug. 15, 2019); Case-Law, EUR-LEx, http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/collection/eu-law/eu-case-law.html [https://perma.cc/8JP6-XJ4N] (last visited Aug.
15, 2019); Recherche Simple Dans La Jurisprudence Judiciaire, LEGIFRANCE, https://
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/rechJuriJudi.do?reprise=true&page=1 [https://perma.cc/2VSP-
LBXP] (last visited Aug. 15, 2019).
221. Not all comparatists are enthusiastic about this trend. Patrick Glenn character-
izes common law judges, who traditionally have the power to make law, as "law-seekers,
and not law-appliers. They are self-disciplining loose cannons, dangerous for systems."
GLENN, supra note 109, at 257.
222. See Alain Lacabarats, The State of Case Law in France, 51 Loy. L. REV. 79, 83
(2005).
223. USAID Helps Vietnam Strengthen the Rule of Law Through Advancing Use of Prece-
dent, U.S. AGENCY INT'L DEV. (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.usaid.gov/vietnam/program-
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ingly codified: as of August 2019, all fifty states in the United States had
enacted Criminal Codes;2 24 forty-nine states had enacted Codes of Crimi-
nal Procedure;2 25 and thirty-seven had enacted Codes of Civil Proce-
dure.226 As Patrick Glenn states, "[l]egislation in the U.S.[ ] has . . .
assumed civilian proportions and often receives civilian treatment.2 27
System convergence is also prevalent in countries with sizeable indige-
nous populations, where lawyers and academics are finding new ways to
engage with indigenous laws. Issues that arise in these contexts mirror
those that appear in other converging systems: legitimacy, harmonization,
and potential conflicts of law.228 Innovative applications of indigenous
law in state courts, including during sentencing proceedings, can be found
in Canada,2 29 Alaska,2 30 and Minnesota,231 among other jurisdictions.2 3 2
updates/aug-2017-usaid-helps-vietnam-strengthen-rule-law-through-advancing-use-pre-
cedent [https://perma.cc/UP5H-ZKJB].
224. See Statutes- Federal and State Criminal Law Statutes: R-Z, PACE L. SCH. LIBR.,
https://ibraryguides.law.pace.edu/c.php?g=319371&p=2133330 [https://perma.cc/
29CL-D922] (last visited Aug. 15, 2019).
225. The exception is Kentucky, where criminal procedure provisions form rules
instead of a code. Nevertheless, the rules are codified. See Criminal Rules of Proce-
dure-Annotated Index-KY, LAw READER, https://awreader.com/?p=12766 [https://
perma.cc/VB3M-2RDF] (last visited Aug. 15, 2019). Codification of civil (as opposed to
criminal) law in the United States has always faced greater resistance than codification
of criminal law. The Field Civil Code, completed in 1862, was rejected entirely in New
York, where it had been drafted, although it was later adopted in California, North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana. Wienczyslaw J. Wagner, Codification of Law in
Europe and the Codification Movement in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century in the United
States, 2 ST. Louis U.L.J. 335, 353-54 (1952).
226. Civil Procedure-State Laws, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/tablecivilprocedure [https://perma.cc/E22G-L9GN] (last visited Aug. 15, 2019).
Civil codes are far less common; fewer than seven states had codified civil law as of
August 2019. Id.
227. GLENN, supra note 109, at 264. At least one scholar states that the common law
is inherently codified even without formal codes since "every statement of law, every
case, and every treatise is already codifying in some way in that it seeks to formulate a
rule that will apply to more than the instant case." Lindsay Farmer, Codification, in THE
OxFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 379, 381 (Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana H6rnle
eds., 2014). Farmer argues that the question is not whether the law should be codified,
but whether it should be codified in a particular way. See id. at 382.
228. Val Napoleon & Hadley Friedland, Indigenous Legal Traditions: Roots to Renais-
sance, in THE OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 227, at 225, 240.
229. Id. at 236 ("These innovative court processes operate within the mainstream jus-
tice system, conform to Canadian criminal procedure, and apply the Criminal Code.").
230. See generally Alaska State Court Acts to Advance Tribal Circle Sentencing, INDIGE-
NOUS PEACEMAKING INIrlATIvE (Feb. 7, 2018), https://peacemaking.narf.org/2018/02/
article-alaska-state-court-acts-to-advance-tribal-circle-sentencing [https://perma.cc/
P4EB-Q5NT].
231. See generally Restorative Justice Factsheet, MINN. STATE L. LIBR., http://mn.gov/
law-library-stat/archive/urlarchive/c9992021.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7ST-W3B4].
232. For an informative description of judicial process in Bantu legal proceedings, see
generally A.L. Epstein, Juridical Techniques and the Judicial Process: A Study in African
Customary Law, in RHODEs-LIvINGSTONE PAPERS (Rhodes-Livingstone Papers No. 23,
1954).
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X. The Need for Systemic Thinking233
The toolkit approach should be used with care; attention must be paid
to the holistic system being created. Transplanting elements of one legal
system into another in which safeguards and checks and balances are lack-
ing risks creating new problems and perpetuating old weaknesses.23 4
Worse, careless transplants may undermine underlying systems' goals and
values, which vary among legal traditions.2 35 Unless legal systems func-
tion as whole, systematic entities with internal coherence, issues-and con-
flict-are likely to return.236 Transplanting procedural rules without an
understanding of the interconnective web of relationships among them
may be even more delicate than transplanting substantive law.23 7
Tradeoffs in process choices are not always simple; providing greater
protections for criminal defendants, for example, will almost certainly
result in delays in investigation, prosecution, and adjudication, potentially
in violation of time limits set by domestic or international law.238 Without
regard for the entirety of the legal system being constructed, problem-solv-
ing goals will not be achieved, and weaknesses associated with each system
may simply be replicated. One Investigating Judge who opposed Sarkozy's
proposed introduction of adversarial aspects into the French inquisitorial
system stated,
I do [not] deny improvements can be made, but the objective should be to
prevent errors rather than suppress an important function in France's justice
system to give it a little more of an Anglo-Saxon look.. . . Doing that will fix
233. The benefit of systemic thinking is not universally accepted by comparatists.
Patrick Glenn associates systemic thinking with Western thought, stating that it is part
of the problem with Comparative Law and calling it "The Great White Lie of Western
Legal Theory." GLENN, supra note 109, at xxvii.
234. As Jorge L. Esquirol states, "[i]t stands to reason . .. that the introduction of
development reform in Latin America would proceed differently than in an Eastern
Europe transitioning from command economies or in an Africa still consolidating rela-
tively new independent states." Esquirol, supra note 71, at 90. This problem may be
especially acute when transplanting elements of common law systems, since safeguards
in that system are not always the product of deliberate design, but instead created in an
ad hoc manner for sui generis reasons. See Picker, supra note 110, at 55.
235. However, Jonathan Miller notes that "there has been significant debate" since the
time of Montesquieu about whether law is "sufficiently autonomous to allow the trans-
plant of norms from one society to another," or whether "law must be rooted in a [spe-
cific] social, economic, and political context." Miller, supra note 70, at 844 n.24.
236. In Haiti, plans for strengthening the entirety of justice sector actors-police, pros-
ecutors, magistrates, and courts-were conducted separately instead of integrating all
actors into one comprehensive development plan. The result was that all strategies
failed. See Stromsem & Trincellito, supra note 68, at 4.
237. See 48 Guy I. Seidman, Comparative Civil Procedure, in THE DYNAMISM OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE-GLOBAL TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 108, at 3, 6; see also Scott
Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 441, 445
(2010); Dodson, supra note 125, at 137 n.21; Richard L. Marcus, Review Essay, Putting
American Procedural Exceptionalism into a Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 709,
710 (2005) ("[E]ven if procedure is not entwined with culture, it may consist of pieces
that are so interdependent that borrowing some substitutes from others would risk
upsetting the whole.").
238. See Bassiouni, supra note 206, at 465.
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nothing and leave us with the inconveniences of both systems.23 9
Political and fiscal realities in post-conflict settings must also be taken
into consideration. Legal system reforms that reallocate or reduce opportu-
nities for corruption may be resisted by those holding power.24 Reforms
that cannot be implemented for financial or other reasons will not only
waste resources, but also risk undermining public confidence in justice
systems at vulnerable junctures.2 41 As Stromseth states, "developing a rea-
sonably functioning justice system requires astute attention to how the
various components relate to one another and to the larger political system
and culture in which they are embedded."242
Finally, when changes to laws and systems are negotiated from politi-
cal-as opposed to technical or substantive-standpoints, an additional set
of issues can arise. As M. Cherif Bassiouni narrates in his history of nego-
tiations regarding the Rome Statute, delegates to the drafting process came
from a variety of legal systems and traditions. Their assigned task was to
achieve political agreement-"even at the cost of creating a consistent and
239. Crumley, supra note 60 (quoting investigative judge Marc Trevidic). In the con-
text of legal reforms in Latin America, Jorge Esquirol states:
[R]eforms advance a specific legal and institutional reconfiguration of criminal
law and its enforcement. Yet, other than making broad statements about democ-
racy and human rights, reformers mostly do not consider the multiple policy
implications that these shifts entail. More prosecutions and speedier trials
mean a different balance between civil liberties and powers of enforcement.
Switching control of the criminal investigation from judges of instruction to
prosecutors means a re-assignment of resources having a range of possible
effects. It may insulate the trial phase from the criminal investigation, but it
may not eliminate any of the problems involving discretion, simply shifting it to
a different office or to officials with different titles. It may also negatively affect
defendants' rights in the investigation phase, previously under the direction of
an active judge. In short, pursuing criminal procedure reform as if merely
replacing the inquisition with democracy, or some other such generalization,
obscures the alternate policies ought to be put in place.
Esquirol, supra note 71, at 109.
240. See Langer, supra note 159, at 3. Jane Stromseth cautions against inadvertent
shifts in power dynamics when engaging in system reform and states that if advisers
"focus solely on building up state institutions, . . . [they may] inadvertently give self-
interested power-holders more effective institutional tools to advance their own agen-
das .... " STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 16, at 179.
241. For example, the introduction of adversarial features into the Russian criminal
justice system in 2002, as an attempt to ensure equality of arms, failed to consider low
numbers of criminal defense lawyers in the country and the inability of most Russians
to afford one. See Newcombe, supra note 62, at 398. In post-conflict Cambodia, intro-
duction of the new Civil Code posed enormous implementation challenges because it
was far more complex than any previous law had been. The introduction of intellectual
property and administrative laws, the result of Western legal advice, were almost entirely
unfamiliar to Cambodian jurists and therefore nearly impossible to implement. See
Menzel, supra note 32, at 486.
[E]ven where provisions are formally copied "one to one" they will often func-
tion somewhat differently in another legal system, particularly when the overall
legal culture is significantly different in the two states. Some comparative law
scholars even think that legal transplants are generally impossible due to this
transformation, although that opinion might be an academic exaggeration.
Id.
242. STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 16, at 179.
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coherent legal method[ology]."24 3 At times, their solution was to build
ambiguities into the Rome Statute and leave them for the courts to deal
with at a later date.2 44 This solution, of course, can be problematic in post-
conflict settings when judiciaries are immature or understaffed and judges
are not yet fully trained.
Conclusion
The shadow of conflict is long. Unaddressed legacies of violence and
oppression can fester for generations within justice systems, making them
instruments of grievous harm. In the United States, for example, stains
from the oppression of African Americans subjected to servitude prior to
the Civil War still linger in its court system. As recently as June 2019, the
Supreme Court referred to post-Civil War constitutional and legislative
reforms, including the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases, and the Civil Rights Act of 1875, as
the fulcrum for invalidating ongoing discriminatory practices in criminal
proceedings, decrying covert attempts by prosecutors to avoid their
application.245
Long-term impacts of colonization can be just as devastating.
246
Colonial movements, for example, drove well-established, indigenous Afri-
can legal traditions into near oblivion, causing fierce struggles to reassert
the legitimacy of customary law.24 7 As Menski states,
[i]t is amazing how self-contradictory the legal arguments over colonial rule
in Africa are. While many authors realise that pre-colonial Africa had its
own, well-established legal systems and was not a tabula rasa, those same
authors often apply culture-blind legocentric assumptions, behaving as
though modern Western laws simply brought salvation to Africa.
2 48
Whether initiated locally or with the assistance of international advis-
ers, legal system reform will inevitably continue to be an important part of
243. Bassiouni, supra note 206, at 460.
244. See id. at 462, 464.
245. See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S.Ct. 2228, 2238-39 (2019). Some argue that the
political transformation that took place following the Civil War and during the Civil
Rights era was incomplete and that a transitional justice process, similar to that under-
taken in South Africa and other countries following conflict, would help in finally estab-
lishing a racially just society in the United States. See, e.g., Andrew Valls, Racial justice
as Transitional justice, 36 POLrY 53, 53 (2003).
246. See Napoleon & Friedland, supra note 228, at 247.
247. See MENsK1, supra note 57, at 21-22; see also T.W. Bennett, Comparative Law and
African Customary Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 103,
at 652, 654-55.
The European powers had a curious relationship with their African countries,
one that has been described as an unhappy blend of tyranny and paternalism.
Because all major decisions were made by absentee sovereigns, far removed from
the sites of implementation, relations between rulers and subjects were, at best,
a "working misunderstanding." Even today, this phrase would be an apt
description of customary law.
Id.
248. MENSKI, supra note 57, at 444.
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post-conflict reconstruction processes. In these contexts, although reform
of constitutional and substantive law will remain a priority, it is fair and
equal procedural law-"the bedrock on which much of social structure is
based"-that is at the heart of achieving justice.249
The proposed problem-solving model utilizing a Comparative Law
methodology seeks to assist in identifying root causes of conflict and
avoiding perpetuating or replicating pre-conflict and colonial practices. It
is also consistent with modern trends in pluralist systems around the
world, including in the European Union.25 0 As Picker states, Comparative
Law-led change "may [now] be unstoppable."251 It may almost be the case
that "Comparative Law-led change may become so normalized as to not
even be noticed-if that has not already happened."25 2
249. Seidman, supra note 237, at 5.
250. See Lenaerts & Gutman, supra note 103, at 844.
251. Picker, supra note 110, at 58.
252. Id. Indeed, discussions are taking place in the field of Comparative Law on top-
ics not even articulated a decade ago. In the 2010 case Taxquet v. Belgium, for example,
the European Court of Human Rights addressed the use of reasoned jury verdicts in
criminal cases. See generally Taxquet v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010). Remarkably,
none of the seventeen judges sitting as members of the Grand Chamber were from a
common law system-the strongest proponent for the use of juries. In Taxquet, the valid-
ity of jury trials was simply taken for granted.
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